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Summary
The Republic of Croatia is facing the biggest restructuring of companies in 
difficulties with substantial involvement of international financial investors. 
Restructuring is implemented according to a newly adopted Act on extraordinary 
administration proceeding in companies of systemic significance for the Republic 
of Croatia. The latter Act was adopted in the aftermath of the business failure 
of the major retailer i.e. the Agrokor group. The restructuring of the group 
has soon become a very sensitive political issue and a topic of heated public 
discussions. The Act has been heavily criticized both by legal scholarship and by 
the public for being designed for a single group of companies in Croatia, as well 
as for being incoherent with constitutional principles and existing insolvency 
legislation. It created a type of debtor-not-in-possession in-court extraordinary 
administration designed for systemic significant (group of) companies in state 
of insolvency or pre-insolvency. Departing from this background, this paper 
aims to provide a wider restructuring picture by comparing three different 
legal models of preventive corporate restructurings for firms in difficulties: the 
German protective shield proceedings, the English schemes of arrangment and 
the Italian extraordinary administration. The authors attempt to evaluate each 
model’s effectiveness on the basis of relevant studies which indicate their success 
rate. As far as the Croatian Act is concerned, the paper provides an overview of 
the development of the preventive restructuring law, while questioning certain 
aspect of the Act, especially the concept of the company of systemic significance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The	restructuring	models	for	companies	in	difficulties	may	take	many	forms.1 
Attempts	to	preserve	the	continuation	of	bussines	of	the	company	debtor,	who	would	
otherwise	be	liquidated,	can	be	designed	as	“debtor-in-posession”	or	“debtor-not-in-
posession”	procedure,	conducted	“at-the-court”	or	“out-of-court”,	“state	assisted”	or	
not.	The	restructuring	may	start	when	first	pre-insolvency	signs	become	apparent	or	
later,	when	 insolvency	or	 overindebtnessness	 appears.	The	 closer	 the	 restructuring	
procedure	 is	 to	 insolvency,	 the	more	 is	 the	whole	 process	 of	 negotiation	 between	
interested	parties	(i.e.	distressed	company	and	its	creditors)	influenced	by	mandatory	
insolvency	law	provisions	relevant	for	composition	of	creditors’	representative	body,	
required	majority	to	render	the	restructuring	plan	etc.	It	has	been	observed	that	out-of-
court	restructurings	are	generally	more	efficient.2	Out-of-court	negotiations	through	
less	 formal	procedure	allow	greater	flexibility	 in	 reaching	a	 restructuring	plan	 that	
conciliates	interests	of	many	stakeholders,	but	they	suffer	from	the	free-rider	issue.3 
In	 out-of-court	 restructurings	major	 creditors,	 or	 among	 them,	 creditors	willing	 to	
provide	new	money,	usually	assume	 the	main	 role,	while	 state-assisted	procedures	
provide instruments that limit opportunities for free riding.4
The timeline of	the	restructuring	procedure	also	plays	a	vital	role.	For	successful	
and	efficient	company	restructuring,	an	early	start	is	crucial.	As	is	well	known,	“the	
later	a	business	initiates	restructuring	proceedings,	the	higher	the	costs	of	restructuring	
	 This	paper	is	written	under	support	of	the	Croatian	Science	Foundation	project	no.	9366	“Legal	
Aspects	 of	 Corporate	Acquisitions	 and	 Knowledge	 Driven	 Companies’	 Restructuring”	 and	
University	of	Rijeka	project	no.	13.08.1.2.01	“Protection	of	Beneficiary	on	the	Croatian	and	
European	Financial	Services	Market”.
1	 See	 generally:	 Adeyemo,	M.	M.,	 Zahralddin-Aravena,	 R.	 X.	 (eds.),	 Reorganizing	 Failing	
Businesses,	 A	 Comprehensive	 Review	 and	 Analysis	 of	 Financial	 Restructuring	 and	
Business	 Reorganization,	 Volume	 I,	 Business	 Bankruptcy	 Committee,	 American	 Bar	
Association,	 Chicago,	 2017,	 Part	 I,	 1.1-1.13.	 Adeyemo,	M.	M.	 Zahralddin-Aravena,	 R.	 X.	
(eds.),	Reorganizing	Failing	Businesses,	A	Comprehensive	Review	and	Analysis	of	Financial	
Restructuring	 and	Business	Reorganization,	Volume	 II,	Business	Bankruptcy	Committee,	
American	 Bar	 Association,	 Chicago,	 2017,	 Part	 IV,	 General	 Considerations	 (sec.17).	 For	
US	law	reorganization	model	 (Chapter	11)	see	generally:	Roe,	M.	J.,	Tung,	F.,	Bankruptcy	
and	Corporate	Reorganization,	Foundation	Press,	4th	 ed.,	St.	Paul,	2016,	p.	603	et	 seq.	For	
comparison	 between	 US	 and	 UK	 law	 which	 dominate	 restructuring	 law,	 see	Mallon,	 C.,	
Waisman,	 S.,	 Y.,	 Schrock,	 R.	 C.,	 The	 Law	 and	 Practice	 of	 Restructuring	 in	 the	 UK	 and	
US,	Oxford	University	Press,	2nd	ed.,	2017,	p.	151-220.	For	types	on	corporate	restructuring	
and	 restructuring	 in	bankruptcy	see	generally:	Gaughan,	P.	A.,	Mergers,	Acquisitions	and	
Corporate	Restructurings,	Wiley,	6th	ed.,	2015,	p.	391-476.	
2 Eidenmueller,	 H.,	 van	 Zwieten,	 K.,	 Restructuring	 the	 European	 Business	 Enterprise:	 The	
EU	Commission	Recommendation	on	a	New	Approach	 to	Business	Failure	and	 Insolvency,	
European	Corporate	Governance	Institute	(ECGI)	-	Law	Working	Paper	No.	301/2015,	Oxford	
Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	No.	52/2015,	p.	2.,	available	at:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662213 
(10	May	2018).
3 Eidenmueller,	 H.,	 Unternehmenssanierung	 zwischen	 Markt	 und	 Gesetz:	 Mechanismen	 der	
Unternehmensreorganisation	 und	 Kooperationspflichten	 im	 Reorganisationsrecht,	 Otto	
Schmidt,	Cologne,	1999,	p.	319	et	seq.
4 Eidenmueller,	H.,	van	Zwieten,	K.,	op.	cit.,	p.	2.	
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and	the	lower	the	management	powers	and	success	rate”.5	Companies	in	difficulities	
should	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 restructure	 their	 debts	 when	 the	 risk	 of	 insolvency	
becomes	apparent,	not	when	it	actually	occurs.	Therefore,	“preventive”	restructuring	
is	gaining	prominence,	both	at	the	EU	and	EU	member	states’	level.	After	its	2014	
recommendation,	which	invited	EU	member	states	to	modernize	their	restructuring	
laws,	 the	 European	 Commission	 proposed	 a	Directive	 on	 preventive	 restructuring	
frameworks,	second	chance	and	measures	to	increase	the	efficiency	of	restructuring,	
insolvency	 and	 discharge	 procedures	 and	 amending	 the	 Directive	 2012/30/EU.6 
Following	the	recast	of	European	Insolvency	Regulation	-	EIR7	that	came	to	force	on	
26	June	2017,	significant	changes	were	made	in	the	recasted	EIR’s	scope	of	application	
because	 some	 pre-insolvency	 and	 debtor-in-possession	 proceedings	 (though	 based	
only	 on	 the	 laws	 related	 to	 insolvency	 –	Art.	 1)	were	 included.	 EIR	 provides	 for	
the	 automatic	 recognition	 of	 insolvency	 proceedings	 throughout	 the	EU.	Scope	 of	
application	is	confined	to	various	corporate	entities	(and	individuals)	with	their	centre	
of	 main	 interest	 (hereinafter:	 COMI)	 within	 a	 member	 state	 of	 the	 EU.	 Now	 the	
COMI	concept	is	explicitly	defined	in	the	EIR	“the	place	where	the	debtor	conducts	
the	 administration	of	 its	 interests	 on	 a	 regular	 basis	 and	which	 is	 ascertainable	by	
third	parties”.8	If	the	type	of	proceedings	comes	into	the	scope	of	application	of	the	
EIR,	this	“main”	proceedings	would	have	extraterritorial	effects	(under	presumption	
that	secondary	proceedings	are	not	opened	in	another	member	state)	irrespective	of	
debtor’s	assets	location	in	the	EU	-	with	exception	of	Denmark.9	Therefore,	some,	but	
not	all	restructuring	models	are	within	the	scope	of	the	recast	EIR.	The	most	popular	
restructuring	 tool,	 namely	 the	UK’s	 scheme	 of	 arrangements	 (hereinafter:	 SoA)	 is	
however	not	within	its	scope.
Due	 to	 diversified	 national	 approaches	 in	 the	 EU	 member	 states	 distressed	
companies’	 restructurings	 cause	 both	 restructuring	 migration	 and	 regulatory	
competition10	which	is	extensively	discussed	by	scholars	while	it	borders	on	forum	
5 EC	Comission,	Impact	Assesment,	2016,	p.	14	et	seq.
6	 Proposal	COM	(2016)	723	final
7 Regulation	(EU)	2015/848	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	20	May	2015	on	
insolvency	proceedings,	OJ	L	141,	5.6.2015.,	p.	19–72.	It	has	provisions	governing	jurisdiction	
for	 opening	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 provisions	 regarding	 the	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	
of	 judgments	 issued	 in	 such	 proceedings,	 and	 provisions	 regarding	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	
insolvency	proceedings,	which	is	lex	fori	concursus.	In	addition,	EIR	aimed	to	lay	down	rules	
on	the	coordination	of	 insolvency	proceedings	which	relate	 to	 the	same	debtor	or	 to	several	
members	of	the	same	group	of	companies.	See	more	the	text	in	preambule	par.	(6)	et	seq.
8 EIR,	Art.	3.	par.	1,	first	sentence.	Some	authors	argue	that	COMI	is	still	not	explicitly	defined.	In	
that	vein	see:	Block-Leib,	S.,	Reaching	to	Restructure	across	Border	(without	over-Reaching),	
Even	After	Brexit,	American	Bankruptcy	Law	Journal,	Vol.	92,	No.	1,	2018,	p.	5.	fn.	16.
9 Eidenmueller,	H.,	van	Zwieten,	K.,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.
10 Ibid.,	p.	9.
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shopping11	and	abuse	of	insolvency	law.12	English	SoA	unquestionably	offers	a	very	
flexible	tool	for	distressed	companies	to	deal	with	financial	difficulties.	It	is	therefore	
not	 surprising	 that	non-UK	distressed	companies	have	used	UK	 law	 to	 facilitate	 a	
corporate	rescue	that	would	not	have	been	possible	under	their	domestic	laws.	It	has	
been	documented	that	important	German	firms,	already	in	the	pre-insolvency	stage,	
moved	their	centre	of	main	interest	(COMI)	 to	England	in	order	 to	be	restructured	
by	 using	 UK	 SoA	model,	 although	 the	 use	 of	 SoA,	 according	 to	 English	 law,	 is	
permitted	 whenever	 there	 is	 “sufficient	 connection”	 to	 UK,	 which	 even	 does	 not	
require	 relocation	 of	COMI.13	However,	 these	 “out-of-home”	 restructuring	models	
are	again	on	trial	when	its	outcomes	(i.e.	court	sanctioned	SoA)	should	be	recognized	
in	the	country	of	the	restructured	company	origin.14	Therefore,	it	has	been	observed	
that	 SoA’s	 involving	 EU-registered	 companies	 should	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 are	
enforceable	relying	on	the	concept	of	court-sanctioned	SoA,	which	will	be	enforceable	
according	 to	 the	Brussels	 II	Regulation.15	The	German	 regulatory	 response	 to	 that	
emigration	followed	with	ESUG	(Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung 
von Unternehmen),	by	which	Germany	tried	to	restore	its	“preventive	restructuring”	
attractiveness,	offering	early	restructuring	of	operative	companies	by	the	introduction	
of	the	protection	scheme	proceedings	(Schutzschirmverfahren). 
11 Ringe,	W.-G.,	Strategic	Insolvency	Migration	and	Community	Law,	in:	Ringe,	Wolf-Georg	at	
al.	(eds.),	Current	Issues	in	European	Financial	and	Insolvency	Law,	1st	ed.,	Hart	Publishing,	
2009,	 p.75-77.	 Eidenmueler,	H.,	 Free	Choice	 in	 International	Company	 Insolvency	Law	 in	
Europe,	Eur.	Bus.	Org.	L.	Rev,	No.	6,	2005,	p.	423	et	seq.,	available	at	https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1566752905004234	(10	May	2018);	Tribe,	J.	P.,	Bankruptcy	Tourism	in	the	European	Union:	
Myth	or	Reality?,	available	at	https://ssrn.com/abstract=2781500	(20	May	2018).	Ringe,	W.-G.,	
Forum	Shopping	under	the	EU	Insolvency	Regulation,	Oxford	Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	
No.	33/2008,	available	at	https://ssrn.com/abstract=1209822	(15	May	2018).
12 Armour,	 J.,	Abuse	 of	 European	 Insolvency	Law,	A	Discussion,	 in:	Rita	 de	 la	 Feria,	 Stefan	
Vogenauer	(eds),	Prohibitions	of	Abuse	of	Law:	A	new	General	Principle	of	EU	Law?,	Studies	
of	the	Oxford	Institute	of	European	and	Comparative	Law,	Hart	Publishing,	2011,	Ch.	11.
13 Extensive	analysis	of	German	(and	non-	German)	companies	restructured	according	to	UK	SoA	
model,	especially	in	regard	to	existing	“sufficiency	of	connections”	see:	Block-Leib,	Susan,	op.	
cit.,	p.	16	et	seq.	Author	notices	that	“even	presence	of	the	English	choice	of	laws	clauses	has	
(…)	found	sufficient	to	satisfy	jurisprudential	requirement	of	connections	between	the	foreign	
company	and	England.”
14 Eidenmüller,	 H.,	 Frobenius,	 T.,	 Die	 internationale	 Reichweite	 eines	 englischen	 Scheme	 of	
Arrangement,	WM	2011,	p.	1210.
15 Regulation	(EU)	No	1215/2012	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	12	December	
2012	on	jurisdiction	and	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	judgments	in	civil	and	commercial	
matters,	OJ	L	351,	20.12.2012,	p.	1–32.	See	more,	Block-Leib,	op.	cit.,	p.	19.
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Italy	 developed	 tailor-made	 state-assisted	 proceedings	 extraordinary	
administration	(hereinafter:	EA)	for	large	businesses	in	distress.16	According	to	Ghia,17 
the	aim	of	the	EA	is	to	preserve	a	business	entity	both	in	its	value	as	a	whole	and	in	its	
value	as	a	group	of	individual	assets.	The	presumption	underlying	this	concept	is	that	
“the	presence	of	contracts,	the	competitiveness	of	the	product,	and	its	marketability	
are	factors	that	cannot	be	dispersed	through	a	liquidation	procedure	while	intangible	
goods	(intellectual	property	assets	and	goodwill)	greatly	lose	their	value.18 With the 
introduction	of	 the	EA,	bankruptcy	proceeding	was	for	 the	first	 time	designed	in	a	
way	to	encourage	the	recovery	of	a	debtor-company	through	composition	agreements	
between	the	debtor	and	its	creditors.19	According	to	some	authors	and	relying	on	an	
extensive	 survey,	 the	EA	 has	 proven	 to	 be	 generally	 efficient,	 although	 effects	 on	
creditors	vary	–	from	significant	recovery	ratios	 to	ratios	not	far	from	the	ones	 the	
creditors	could	have	if	the	company	had	gone	bankrupt.20 
At	the	moment,	Croatia	is	facing	the	biggest	(group	of)	companies	in	difficulties	
restrucuturing	ever,	with	a	substantial	involvement	of	international	financial	investors	
specialized	for	distressed	firms,	also	known	as	vultures.21	The	Act	on	extraordinary	
administration	proceeding	in	companies	of	systemic	significance	for	the	Republic	of	
Croatia	(hereinafter:	EAPA)22	was	introduced	when	the	threat	of	business	failure	of	
the	major	retailer	became	imminent.	It	is	a	type	of	debtor-not-in-possession	in-court	
EA	designed	for	large	companies	in	state	of	insolvency	or	pre-insolvency.	The	EAPA	
was	seriously	criticized	both	by	legal	scholarship	and	the	public	for	being	designed	
for	 a	 single	 group	 of	 companies	 in	 Croatia,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 being	 incoherent	 with	
16 Castagnola,	A.,	Sacchi,	R.	 (eds.),	La	 legge	Marzano-Commentario,	Torino,	2006,	p.	1-290.,	
Pacchi,	S.,	Alcune	riflessioni	in	tema	di	insolvenza,	impresa	e	complesso	aziendale,	derivanti	
dalla	 lettura	 della	 legge	 delega	 per	 l’emanazione	 della	 nuova	 legge	 sull’amministrazione	
straordinaria,	Giur.	comm.,	1999,	I,	p.	314;	Pacchi,	S.,	L’amministrazione	straordinaria	delle	
imprese	di	«rilevanti	dimensioni»,	 in:	Trattato	di	diritto	delle	procedure	 concorsuali,	Apice,	
Umberto	(ed.)	III,	Torino,	2011;	Zanichelli,	V.,	L’amministrazione	straordinaria,	in	Fallimento	
e	altre	procedure	concorsuali,	diretto	da	G.	Fauceglia,	L.	Panzani,	Torino,	2009.	Zanichelli,	V.,	I	
concordati	giudiziali,	Torino,	2010.	Falini,	Alberto,	La	straordinaria	amministrazione:	elementi	
di	criticità	nella	comunicazione	e	nel	controllo	delle	imprese	in	amministrazione	straordinaria,	
Milano,	Franco	Angeli,	2008,	p.	1-146.	
17 Ghia,	L.,	Restructurings	 and	Reorganizations	 in	 Italy	 -	An	Overview	of	 Italian	Bankruptcy	
Legislation	 for	Large	 Insolvent	Companies,	 International	 Insolvency	Institute,	Tenth	Annual	
International	 Insolvency	Conference	Rome,	 Italy,	 June	7-8,	 2010,	 p.	 2,	 available	 at:	https://
www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/Lucio_Ghia.pdf	(10	June	2018).	
18 Loc.	cit.	
19 Manganelli,	 P.,	 The	 Evolution	 of	 the	 Italian	 and	U.S.	 Bankruptcy	 Systems:	 a	 Comparative	
Analysis,	Journal	of	Business	&	Technology	Law,	Vol.	5,	Issue	2,	Article	4,	p.	242,	available	at:	
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1146&context=jbtl (22 
June	2018).	
20 Danovi,	A.,	Managing	 large	 corporate	 crisis	 in	 Italy:	 an	 empirical	 survey	 on	 extraordinary	
administration,	Journal	of	Global	Strategic	Management,	Vol.	4,	No.	2,	2010,	p.	61-76.	
21 Gilson,	S.	C.,	Creating	Value	through	Corporate	Restructuring,	2nd	ed.,	Wiley	Finance,	2010,	p.	
17.
22 Zakon	 o	 postupku	 izvanredne	 uprave	 u	 trgovačkim	 društvima	 od	 sistemskog	 značaja	 za	
Republiku	Hrvatsku,	Official	Gazette,	No.	32/17.
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constitutional	principles	and	the	existing	insolvency	laws.23	With	this	law,	the	Croatian	
legislator	has	departed	from	its	general	role	model	in	company	and	insolvency	matters,	
i.e.	German	law	and	resorted	to	the	Italian	model	applied	for	the	first	time	when	Italy	
faced	the	financial	collapse	of	the	food	giant	Parmalat.24 
The	 EAPA	 now	 appears	 as	 a	 “strange	 puzzle”	 in	 the	 system	 of	 preventive	
restructuring	law.	Due	to	its	inconsistencies	and	understatements,	its	constitutionality	
was	questioned,	yet	the	Constitutional	Court	dismissed	the	petitions.	The	first	case	of	
application	of	the	EA	in	Croatia	is	still	in	motion.	It	seems	that	this	sudden	legislative	
shift	needs	more	probing	into	both	the	design	and	efficiency	of	the	particular	preventive	
restructuring	models.	This	paper	focuses	on	three	legal	models	(as	stated	above)	of	
preventive	corporate	restructurings	for	firms	in	difficulties,	not	only	to	inspect	their	
general	features,	but	also	to	analyse	how	they	function	in	practice	in	terms	of	their	
main	benefits	and	drawbacks.	As	far	as	the	Croatian	law	is	concerned,	the	paper	zooms	
in	on	the	notion	of	the	company	of	systemic	significance	as	the	cornerstone	of	the	law.	
On	the	basis	of	all	findings,	the	authors	offer	de lege ferenda proposals.
2. REVIEW OF THREE (PREVENTIVE) RESTRUCTURING 
MODELS
2.1. The German Protective Schield Proceedings (PSP)
The	 German	 Insolvency	 Code	 (Insolvenzordnung	 –	 hereinafter:	 InsO)25	 was	
significantly	changed	 in	2012	with	 the	Reorganization	Facilitation	Act	 (Gesetz zur 
weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen, hereinafter: ESUG)26	with	
the	aim	of	facilitating	early	restructuring	of	operative	companies	by	the	introduction	of	
the	protection	scheme	proceedings	(Schutzschirmverfahren, hereinafter:	PSP).27 With 
ESUG,	the	German	legislature	tried	to	regain	its	reorganization	attractiveness28 and 
prevent	further	emigration	of	German	companies	to	the	UK	in	order	to	be	reorganized	
under	 the	 English	 Scheme	 of	Arrangement	 (hereinafter:	 SoA).29	 By	 virtue	 of	 the	
23 See	 Garašić,	 J.,	 Izvanredna	 uprava	 države	 nad	 povezanim	 društvima,	 Zbornik	 55.	 susreta	
pravnika	Opatija,	2017.	
24 Legislative	Decree	23.	Dec.	2003	n.	347	and	amended	18	Feb	2004	n.	39.
25 Insolvenzordnung	 of	 5	October	 1994	 (BGBl.	 I	 S.	 2866),	 last	 amendment	 of	 23	 June	 2017	
(BGBl.	I	S.	1693).
26 This	amendment	of	InsO-a	was	brought	on	13	December	2012,	entered	into	force	on	1	March	
2012	(BGBI	I	S.	2582).
27 See	 an	 overview	 of	 changes	 introduced	 by	 ESUG	 in	 Trilling,	 P.,	 Eigenverwaltung	 und	
Schutzschirmverfahren	 nach	 dem	 ESUG,	 Wirkungen	 dieser	 Anreizinstrumente	 auf	 eine	
frühzeitige	 Insolvenzantragstellung	des	Schuldners,	 Igel	Verlag,	Hamburg,	 2014;	Kann,	van	
J.,	Redeker,	R.,	Reform	Act	on	German	 Insolvency	Law:	New	Opportunities	 for	Distressed	
Investors?,	Pratt’s	Journal	of	Bancruptcy	Law,	Vol.	8,	No.	5,	2012,	pp.	436-442.
28 Sax,	S.,	Ponseck,	J.,	Swierczok,	A.	M.,	Ein	vorinsolvenzliches	Restrukturierungs-verfahren	für	
europäische	Unternehmen,	Betriebs	Berater,	Heft	7,	2017,	p.	323.	
29 English	 Companies	 Act	 2006,	 last	 amended	 on	 26	 June	 2017,	 available	 at:	 https://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents.	 On	 the	 impact	 of	 regulatory	 competition	 on	
development	of	national	preventive	insolvency	proceedings	see	Eidenmüller,	H.,	van	Zwieten,	
E. ČULINOVIĆ-HERC, A. ZUBOVIĆ, M. BRAUT FILIPOVIĆ, The preventive ...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. u Rij., vol. 39, br. 4 (Posebni broj), 1447-1478 (2018) 1453
ESUG,	the	German	law	tried	to	increase	the	number	of	reorganization	proceedings.30 
It	 is	 important	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 German	 PSP	 is	 not	 a	 stand-alone	
preventive	restructuring	proceeding,	but	rather	the	first	stage	of	ordinary	preliminary	
proceedings.31 
The	PSP	is	initiated	by	an	order	of	the	insolvency	court.	A	petition	for	opening	
PSP	(i.e.	self-administration	or	Eigenverwaltung)	is	filed	by	the	debtor	together	with	
a	 petition	 for	 the	 opening	 of	 insolvency	 proceedings	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 imminent	
insolvency	 -	 prospective	 illiquidity	 (drohende Zahlungsunfihigkeit)	 or	 over-
indebtedness (Überschuldung).32	During	the	PSP,	the	debtor	remains	in	control	of	the	
company’s	management.33	Together	with	the	proposal,	a	debtor	encloses	a	‘restructuring	
certificate’,	provided	by	a	person	(tax	adviser,	accountant	or	lawyer)	experienced	in	
insolvency	matters	confirming	imminentilliquidity	or	over-indebtedness,	absence	of	
illiquidity	and	providing	proof	that	the	intended	restructuring	does	not	manifestly	lack	
a	prospect	of	success.34	Within	PSP,	the	debtor	will	be	granted	a	certain	period	of	time,	
not	exceeding	three	months,	to	submit	the	insolvency	plan	(Insolvenzplan).35 Three 
months	is	estimated	as	enough	time	for	debtor	to	develop	the	plan	for	restructuring	the	
company.36	The	competent	insolvency	court	will	also	appoint	a	preliminary	creditors’	
trustee (vorläufiger Sachwalter).37	When	exercising	its	appointing	powers,	the	court	
should	generally	accept	a	preliminary	creditors’	trustee	as	proposed	by	debtor	and	it	can	
only	refuse	the	proposal	on	the	grounds	of	the	candidate’s	insufficient	qualifications.38 
After	opening	the	PSP,	individual	enforcement	measures	are	prohibited,	allowing	the	
debtor in possession to negotiate the plan.39	At	the	request	of	the	debtor,	the	court	can	
allow	the	debtor	to	create	preferential	claims	against	the	estate,	to	be	satisfied	in	full	
(e.g.	claims	of	existing	suppliers).	That	encourages	providers	of	 the	new	money	to	
K.,	op.	cit.,	p.	2.	See	also	Schneider,	S.,	Is	Germany	about	to	become	the	most	attractive	place	
for	business	restructurings?,	Insolvency	nad	Restructuring	International,	Vol.	10,	No.	2,	2016,	
p. 15.
30 See	Ahrens,	M.,	Von	 der	Konkurs-	 über	 die	Gesamtvollstreckungs-	 zur	 Insolvenzordnungs,	
Yonsei	Law	Journal,	Vol.	6,	No.	1&2,	p.	134;	Grell,	F.,	Hauke,	H.,	Splittgerber,	D.,	Pre-Packaged	
Insolvencies	on	the	Rise	in	Germany?	Evaluating	the	German	ESUG,	Expert	guide:	Bankruptcy	
&	restructuring	2014,	March,	p.	52,	available	at:	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/pre-
packaged-insolvencies-on-the-rise-in-germany-evaluating-the-german-esug	 (10	 May	 2018).	
Authors	point	that	an	important	result	of	the	ESUG	is	a	thorough	change	to	German	insolvency	
law	‘culture’.
31 Kann,	 van	 J.,	 Redeker,	 R.,	 op.	 cit., p.	 440.	 See	 also,	 Study	 for	 the	 JURI	 Committee,	 The	
Commission	Insolvency	Proposal	and	its	Impact	on	the	Protection of Creditors,	June	2017,	p.	
32.,	 available	 at:	 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583155/IPOL_
STU(2017)583155_EN.pdf	(12	May	2018).
32 §	270.b	(1)	InsO.
33 Moravec,	T.,	Pastorčak,	J.,	Valenta,	P.,	European	Regulation	of	Insolvency	Status	in	the	Hybrid	
Proceeding,	US-	China	Law	Review,	Vol.	12,	2015,	p.	459.
34 §	270.b	(1)	InsO.
35 §	270.b	(1)	InsO.
36 Kann,	van	J.,	Redeker,	R.,	op.	cit., p. 441.
37 §	270.c	InsO.
38 §	270.b	(2)	InsO.
39 §	270.b	(2)	InsO	together	with	§	21	InsO.
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invest	in	the	distressed	company.40	In	order	to	provide	for	the	successful	development	
of	an	insolvency	plan,	during	a	short	period	of	the	PSP,	the	collaboration	of	at	least	
51%	of	 the	major	creditors	 is	required.41	Preliminary	Proceedings	and	the	PSP	end	
when	a	court	initiates	the	insolvency	proceedings.	
According	to	the	general	opinion,	ESUG	has	proven	a	success	for	it	enabled	both	
creditors	and	debtors	to	use	German	insolvency	law	more	efficiently	with	a	view	to	
procuring	their	legitimate	interests.42	Its	effectiveness	was	tested	in	various	independent	
studies.	For	our	purpose	we	 single	out	 the	findings	of	 the	 following	 three	 studies.	
The	first	one,	carried	out	by	the	Boston	Consulting	Group	Study	in	201343	showed	a	
relatively	low	number	of	initiated	PSPs	in	relation	to	total	insolvency	proceedings,	i.e.	
only	2.4%.44	The	typical	entity	using	PSP	was	rather	large,	with	an	annual	turnover	of	
at	least	€	15	million	and	a	minimum	of	150	employees.45	In	another	2015	McKinsey	
and	Noerr	InsO	study,46	German	insolvency	law	received	top	marks	from	restructuring	
and	insolvency	experts.47	Improved	opportunities	for	creditors	to	exercise	influence,	
speediness	of	restructuring	procedure	under	PSP	were	deemed	a	success.	However,	
it	was	observed	that	1/3	of	the	self-administrations	applied	for,	went	into	insolvency	
which	was	not	a	sign	of	high	success	rate.48	The	weakest	point	for	self-administration	
proceedings	was	found	in	the	management’s	lack	of	competence.	Continued	absence	of	
group	insolvency	law	was	highlighted	by	many	experts	as	a	considerable	drawback.49 
The	 third,	 the	 2017	Boston	Consulting	Group	 study50	 assessed	 the	first	 5	 years	 of	
ESUG	 since	 its	 enactment.	 It	 concluded	 that	 the	 law	 has	 been	 largely	 successful,	
with	a	few	exceptions.	The	positive	effects	include	the	average	duration	of	the	PSP	
which	is	shorter	then	the	regular	insolvency	proceedings.51	On	the	other	side,	there	
was	no	evidence	that	restructuring	applications	are	being	submitted	any	sooner	than	
before	the	introduction	of	the	ESUG.52	The	study	further	pointed	out	some	additional	
noteworthy	facts.	First,	self-administration	of	corporate	restructuring	indeed	remains	
40 Clifford	&	Chance,	A	Guide	to	European	Restructuring	and	Insolvency	Proceedings,	September	
2015,	 str.	 98	 available	 at:	 https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2015/09/a_guide_to_
europeanrestructuringandinsolvenc.html	(12	May	2018).
41 § 272 InsO.
42 Schneider,	S.,	op.	cit.,	p.	17.
43 The	Boston	Consulting	Group,	Zwei	Jahre	ESUG,	Hype	weicht	Realtät,	March	2014,	http://
www.ifus-institut.de/fileadmin/pdf/Newsletter/BCG/BCG_2_Jahre_ESUG.pdf	 (15 April 
2018).
44 Ibid.,	p.	3.
45 Ibid.,	p.	7.
46 McKinsey	 &	 Noerr,	 InsO	 study	 2015,	 Are	 German	 insolvency	 statutes	 internationally	
competitive	after	3	years	of	ESUG?,	Berlin	June	2015,	available	at:	https://www.noerr.com/~/
media/Noerr/PressAndPublications/News/2015/insolvenzstudie/Insolvency-Study-EN_short.
pdf	(20	April	2018).
47 Ibid.,	p.	5.
48 Ibid.,	p.	8.
49 Ibid.,	p.	17.
50 The	Boston	Consulting	Group,	 Fünf	 Jahre	ESUG,	Wesentliche	Ziele	 erreicht,	March	 2017,	
available at: http://media-publications.bcg.com/13mar2017-Studie.pdf	(15	April	2018).
51 Ibid.,	p.	11.
52 Ibid.,	p.	3.
E. ČULINOVIĆ-HERC, A. ZUBOVIĆ, M. BRAUT FILIPOVIĆ, The preventive ...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. u Rij., vol. 39, br. 4 (Posebni broj), 1447-1478 (2018) 1455
the	exception.	The	current	share	of	self-administration	proceedings	remains	at	a	stable	
2.6%	of	all	insolvency	proceedings.53	Second,	self-administration	remains	important	
for	large	companies,	but	is	increasingly	interesting	to	small	companies	as	well.54 More 
than	 half	 (58%)	of	 the	 largest	 50	 corporate	 bankruptcies	 in	 2016	were	 handled	 as	
self-administered	proceedings.	Third,	 self-administration	 remains	very	attractive	 to	
shareholders.	In	more	than	half	of	the	proceedings	(58%),	shareholder’s	rights	were	
not	 affected.55	 Fourth,	 in	90%	of	 total	 proceedings	 creditors	have	had	 to	 renounce	
more	than	50%	of	their	claims,56	which	generates	a	rather	modest	success	for	them.
2.2. The English Scheme of Arrangement 
In	the	UK,	the	preventive	restructuring	framework	is	composed	of	two	different	
proceedings:57	Company	Voluntary	Arrangements	(hereinafter:	CVA)58	and	Scheme	of	
Arrangement	(hereinafter:	SoA).59	The	latter	has	been	increasingly	used	in	financial	
restructuring	of	international	(group	of)	companies.60 
The	CVA	is	primarily	designed	for	small	companies,	although	it	is	available	to	
any	company,	regardless	of	its	size.	The	moratorium	period	of	up	to	three	months	for	
the	company	is	available	to	small	companies	only	(companies	which	satisfy	at	least	
two	of	the	following	three	requirements:	turnover	of	not	more	than	£6.5	million,	assets	
of	not	more	than	£3.26	million;	and	less	than	50	employees).61	One	of	the	reasons	why	
the	moratorium	 is	not	 available	 to	 large	 companies	 is	 the	 legislative	 intention	 that	
large	companies	should	follow	administrative	procedure	and	preventive	restructuring	
introduced	by	SoA.62	For	the	CVA	proposal	to	be	approved,	more	than	one	half	(in	
53 Ibid.,	p.	5.
54 Ibid.,	p.	6.
55 Ibid.,	p.	16.
56 Loc.	cit.
57 For	an	overview	of	UK	Insolvency	Law	and	the	preventive,	i.e.	rescue	proceedings,	see	Finch,	
V.,	Milman,	D.,	Corporate	Insolvency	Law,	Perspectives	and	Principles,	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2017,	pp.	409	–	450.	See	also	Armour,	J.,	Hsu,	A.,	Walters,	A.,	Corporate	Insolvency	in	
United	Kingdom:	The	Impact	of	the	Enterprise	Act	2002,	Vol.	5,	No.	2,	June	2008,	pp.	148-171.	
For	comparison	with	US	law,	see:	Mallon,	Christopher,	Waisman,	Shai,	Y.,	Schrock,	Ray	C.,	op.	
cit.,	p.	151-220.
58 Regulated	 in	 Insolvency	 Act	 1986,	 in	 Articles	 1	 –	 7B	 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1986/45/contents)
59 Part	26	(articles	895	–	901)	of	English	Companies	Act	2006.
60 Sax,	S.,	Swierczok,	A.,	The	Recognition	of	an	Englich	Scheme	of	Arrangement	in	Germany	
Post	Brexit;	The	Same	But	Different?,	International	Corporate	Rescue,	Vol.	14,	No.	1,	2017,	p.	
38.
61 The	moratorium	period	for	small	companies	using	the	CVA	was	introduced	by	the	amendment	
in	2000	(Insolvency	Act	2000),	which	came	into	force	on	1	January	2003.	See	Article	3	(2)	of	
Schedule	A1	of	Insolvency	Act	1986.	See	a	brief	overview	in	Finch,	V.,	Corporate	rescue:	a	
game	of	three	halves,	Legal	Studies,	Vol.	32,	No.	2,	June	2012,	p.	320.	
62 Fletcher,	 I.F.,	 UK	 Corporate	 Rescue:	 Recent	 Developments	 –	 Changes	 to	 Administrative	
Receivership,	Administration,	 and	Company	Voluntary	Arrangements	 –	The	 Insolvency	Act	
2000,	The	White	Paper	2001,	and	the	Enterprise	Act	2002,	European	Business	Organization	
Law	Review,	Vol.	5,	No.	1,	2004,	p.	131.	
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value)	of	the	shareholders	and	more	than	three	quarters	in	value	of	the	creditors	must	
vote	in	favor	of	it.	The	creditors’	decision	holds	precedence	subject	to	an	appeal	by	
the	shareholders	before	the	court,63	after	which	the	scheme	becomes	binding.	Thus,	it	
makes	the	decision	a	compromise	between	the	creditors	and	the	shareholders,	without	
having	to	involve	the	court	(except	for	the	possibility	of	appeal).64	However,	there	is	
no	clear	conclusion	whether	the	CVAs	are	actually	successful	in	practice.65
SoA is	a	court-assisted	reorganization	procedure	regulated	in	Part	26,	Section	
895-901	of	the	Companies	Act	2006.	It	allows	the	court	to	sanction	a	“compromise	or	
arrangement”	that	has	been	agreed	between	the	relevant	class	or	classes	of	creditors	
or	members	and	the	company.66	As	opposed	to	CVAs,	SoAs	are	commenced	by	initial	
application	 to	 the	court,	which	decides	whether	 to	order	a	meeting	of	 the	creditors	
and	members	of	the	company.67	The	application	for	SoA	can	be	filed	by	the	company	
itself;	any	creditor	of	a	member	of	 the	company,	 liquidator	or	administrator.68	Any	
arrangement	brought	by	the	creditors	and	shareholders	shall	be	binding	if	the	majority	
which	represents	75%	in	value	of	creditors	(or	class	of	creditors)	or	members	(or	class	
of	members)	which	are	present	at	the	meeting	agree,	subject	to	a	subsequent	court’s	
approval	(i.e.	 to	sanction	the	agreement).69	Thereby,	the	majority	of	creditors	binds	
the	minority	 (cram-down	mechanism	within	 each	 class	 of	 creditors)	which	makes	
SoA	a	very	efficient	restructuring	mechanism.70	Also,	a	company	is	free	to	choose	the	
creditors	or	class	of	creditors	with	whom	it	wishes	to	reach	an	arrangement,	all	of	those	
subject	 to	a	court’s	final	approval.71	Although	 the	court	assumes	a	more	prominent	
role	within	 the	SoA,	SoA	still	 remains	primarily	 a	private-law	agreement	between	
the	creditors	and	shareholders.	Directors	stay	in	control,	as	the	SoA	does	not	require	
engaging	an	insolvency	practitioner	in	formulating	and	exercising	the	scheme.72 
SoA	is	a	flexible	procedure,	which	could	allow	for	example,	a	simple	extension	
of	duration	of	 the	claims,	debt	 to	equity	swap	for	highly	complicated	restructuring	
measures	 or	 combination	 of	 different	 measures.73	 The	 overall	 timing	 of	 a	 SoA	
implementation	 depends	 on	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 restructuring	 but	 generally,	 it	 is	
63 Article	4.A	(2)	of	the	Insolvency	Act	1986	and	articles	1.19	–	1.20	of	Insolvency	Rules	1986.	
See	also	McKenzie-Skene,	D.	W.,	How	insolvency	works	 in	Scotland,	Juta’s	Business	Law,	
Vol.	11,	No.	2,	2003,	p.	108.
64 Finch,	V.,	Milman,	D.,	op.	cit.,	p.	418.
65 See	an	overview	of	conducted	CVAs	in	Walters,	A.,	Frisby,	S.,	Preliminary	Report	to	the	UK	
Insolvency	Service	into	Outcomes	in	Company	Voluntary	Arrangements,	available	at	https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1792402	(8	May	2018);	Armour,	J.,	Hsu,	A.,	Walters,	A.,	op.	cit., p. 158.
66 Article	895	(1)	of	Companies	Act	2006.	Both	terms	„compromise“	and	„arrangement“	have	no	
legal	statutory	meaning,	but	rather	ordinary	commercial	meaning.	Thus	they	pose	no	obstacle	
in	 application	 of	 the	 SoA.	 See	 Payne,	 J.,	 Schemes	 of	Arrangement:	 Theory,	 Structure	 and	
Operation,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	2014,	p.	20.
67 Article	896	(1)	of	Companies	Act	2006.	See	more	in	Payne,	J.,	op.	cit.,	p.	36.
68 Article	896	(2)	of	Companies	Act	2006.
69 Article	899	(1)	of	Companies	Act	2006.
70 Sax,	S.,	Swierczok,	A.,	op.	cit., p. 38.
71 Payne,	J.,	op.	cit.,	p.	42.
72 Finch,	V.,	Milman,	D.,	op.	cit.,	p.	412.
73 Sax,	S.,	Swierczok,	A.,	op.	cit., p. 38.
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completed	in	approximately	eight	weeks	which	is	one	of	its	most	important	benefits.74 
However,	in	contrast	to	the	CVA,	there	is	no	moratorium	period	granted	towards	the	
company’s	 creditors,	 which	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	main	 disadvantages	 of	
SoAs.75
The	court	not	only	has	the	authority	to	review	the	SoA	and,	if	satisfied,	approve	
it,	but	also	enjoys	a	rather	wide	discretion	in	this	regard.	There	are	three	main	criteria	
established	 in	 the	 settled	 case	 law	 which	 courts	 examinebefore	 sanctioning	 the	
scheme:	compliance	with	the	statutory	requirements;	making	sure	that	the	majority	
fairly	represents	the	class	(which	includes	the	test	if	the	majority	of	relevant	creditors	
are	acting	in	good	faith	and	are	not	simply	coercing	the	minority	in	order	to	promote	
their	own	interests),	and	that	the	scheme	is	such	that	an	intelligent	and	honest	person	
who	may	be	affected	by	the	scheme	might	reasonably	approve	it.76	The	SoA	becomes	
legally	effective	when	filed	with	the	Registrar.77
English	 courts	have	allowed	 the	 application	 for	 the	SoA	even	 for	 companies	
which	do	not	have	COMI	or	an	establishment	in	England,	under	a	relatively	flexible	
condition	of	having	“sufficient	connection	with	England”.78	Thus,	the	SoA	has	been	
successfully	used	even	for	restructuring	of	foreign	(predominantly	German)	companies,	
including	group	of	companies.79	These	cases	are	for	example	Telecolumbus	in	2010,	
Rodenstock	GmbH	in	2011,	Apcoa	Parking	Holding	GmbH	in	2014,	CBR	Fashion	in	
2016	and	others.80 
However,	 the	main	risk	for	 foreign	companies	 is	whether	 the	scheme	will	be	
recognized	 in	 the	 relevant	 jurisdiction.81	 The	 likelihood	 of	 recognition	 in	 targeted	
(foreign)	country	 is	also	one	of	 the	 factors	which	English	courts	 take	 into	account	
when	deciding	on	their	jurisdiction.82	Within	the	EU,	the	SoA	falls	outside	of	the	scope	
of	the	Insolvency	Regulation	(2015/848).83	On	the	other	side,	the	prevailing	opinion	
74 See	Weil,	Schemes	of	Arrangement	as	Restructuring	Tools,	2015,	p.	11,	available	at:	https://
eurorestructuring.weil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/140553_LO_BFR_Schemes_
Arrangement_Brochure_v12.pdf	(25	April	2018).
75 Finch,	V.,	Milman,	D.,	op.	cit.,	p.	414.
76 For	an	overview	of	 the	case	 law	and	standards	 for	approving	 the	 scheme	under	SoA	see	 in	
Payne,	J.,	Schemes	of	Arrangement,	Takeovers	and	Minority	Protection,	Journal	of	Corporate	
Law	Studies,	Vol.	11,	2011,	p.	93	and	further.
77 Article	899	(4)	of	Companies	Act	2006.
78 Goldrein,	A.,	Ready,	Willing	and	Able,	but	Perhaps	Not	Always	Acceptable:	UK	Schemes	of	
Arrangement	in	Europe,	Pratt’s	Journal	of	Bankruptcy	Law,	Vol.	7,	No.	2,	2011,	p.	115.	See	
also	Moravec,	T.,	The	Choice	of	Insolvency	Regime	in	Hybrid	Proceeding	by	Entrepreneuers,	
Curentul	Juridic,	2014,	Vol.	57,	No.	2,	p.	142.	Block-Leib,	Susan,	op.	cit.,	p.	15	et	seq.
79 Sax,	S.,	Swierczok,	A.,	op.	cit., p. 38.
80 See	Weil,	op.	cit.,	p.	10.	See	also,	Study	for	the	JURI	Committee,	cit.,	p.	17.
81 Sax,	S.,	Swierczok,	A.,	op.	cit., p.	39.	Block-Leib,	Susan,	op.	cit.,	p.	1-51.
82 See	Sax,	S.,	Swierczok,	A.,	op.	cit., p.	39.	See	also	Goldrein,	A.,	op.	cit., p.	117	and	further;	
Payne,	 J.,	Cross-border	Schemes	 of	Arrangement	 and	Forum	Shopping,	European	Business	
Organization	Law	Review,	Vol.	14,	No.	4,	2013,	p.	581.
83 Regulation	(EU)	2015/848	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	20	May	2015	on	
insolvency	proceedings,	OJ	L	141,	5.6.2015,	p.	19–72.	The	SoA	is	not	listed	in	the	Annex	A	
which	defines	which	insolvency	proceedings	fall	within	the	scope	of	the	Insolvency	Regulation.	
See	also	Eidenmüller,	H.,	Zwieten,	van	K.,	op.	cit.,	p.	20.	Payne,	J.,	op.	cit., p. 582.
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in	scholarly	writings84	and	in	settled	case	law85	 is	that	the	SoA,	i.e.	a	judgement	of	
the	English	 court	 should	 be	 recognized	 in	EU	member	 states	 (in	 accordance	with	
the	Brussels	 I	Recast	Regulation86	 or	 in	 accordance	with	 the	Rome	Convention87).	
However,	this	standpoint	was	seriously	questioned	by	the	ruling	of	a	German	court	in	
the	case	of	Equitable	Life	Assurance	Society,88	where	it	was	argued	that	the	scheme	
does	not	qualify	as	a	“judgement”	within	the	Brussels	I	Recast	Regulation,	and	thus	
cannot	be	recognized	in	Germany.89	Still,	it	remains	unclear	whether	German	courts	
will	follow	this	line	of	reasoning	or	not,	as	there	are	dissenting	views	on	this	matter	
in	the	German	case	from	2010	before	the	Potsdam	Regional	Court.90	Some	authors	
argue	that	this	is	a	matter	for	the	interpretation	by	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	
Union.91
After	Brexit,	i.e.	the	official	withdrawal	of	the	UK	from	the	EU,	the	issue	of	the	
recognition	of	SoAs	in	EU	member	states	remains	even	more	unclear.	In	the	opinion	
of	 some	German	 authors,	 there	 are	 several	 other	 paths	 to	 recognize	 the	 SoA	 after	
Brexit	 in	Germany,	 rendering	 it	a	useful	and	effective	 restructuring	 tool	even	after	
Brexit.92
2.3. The Italian Model for large companies – EA
Although	 Italy	 has	 one	 of	 the	 most	 developed	 legal	 systems,	 with	 various	
available	 insolvency	and	pre-insolvency	 restructuring	 tools	 for	 the	 restructuring	of	
large	 companies,	 the	EA	constitutes	 the	most	 important.	The	history	of	 the	 Italian	
model	 for	 restructuring	of	 large	 (but	 insolvent)	 corporations	begins	with	 the	Prodi	
Law,93	whereby	EA	was	 introduced	 and	 then	 revised	 and	 replaced	with	 the	Prodi-
84 See	Sax,	S.,	Swierczok,	A.,	op.	 cit., p.	39.	See	also	Kuipers,	 J-J.,	Schemes	of	Arrangement	
and	 Voluntary	 Collective	 Redress:	A	 Gap	 in	 the	 Brussels	 I	 Regulation,	 Journal	 of	 Private	
International	Law,	Vol.	8,	No.	2,	2012,	p.	229.
85 See	Re	Rodenstock	GmbH	[2011]	EWHC	1104,	par.	76.	Re	Primacom	Holding	GmbH	[2012]	
EWHC	164.
86 Regulation	(EU)	No	1215/2012	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	12	December	
2012	on	jurisdiction	and	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	judgments	in	civil	and	commercial	
matters,	OJ	L	351,	20.12.2012,	p.	1–32.	Applicable	articles	should	be	Article	2	(a)	together	with	
Article	36	of	the	Brussels	I	Recast	Regulation.	
87 80/934/EEC:	Convention	on	the	law	applicable	to	contractual	obligations	opened	for	signature	
in	Rome	on	19	June	1980,	OJ	L	266,	9.10.1980,	p.	1–19.
88 OLG	Celle	8	U	46/09,	8	September	2009.	
89 For	an	overview	of	the	case	see	Payne,	J.,	op.	cit., p. 584 and further. 
90 LG	Potsdam,	 2	O	 501/07.	 Likewise,	 following	 the	 appeal	 on	 the	Equitable	Life	Assurance	
Society	Case,	in	the	BGH	ruling	this	issue	reamins	rather	vauge.	See	BGH,	15.2.2012	–	IV	ZR	
194/09.
91 For	an	overview	of	the	case	see	Payne,	J.,	op.	cit., p.	586.
92 See	 Sax,	 S.,	 Swierczok,	A.,	 op.	 cit., p.	 46.	 Block-Leib,	 Susan,	 op.	 cit.,	 p.	 1-51,	 discussing	
extensively	forum	shopping	issues.
93 Legislative	Decree	no.	95	of	April	3,	1979.	For	an	overview	of	historical	development	of	Italian	
law	see	D’Ambrosio,	A.,	Le	nuove	tendenze	della	disciplina	sull’amministrazione	straordinaria	
delle	grandi	imprese	alla	luce	della	l.	166/08,	doctoral	thesis,	Universita’	degi	studi	di	Napoli	
Federico	 II,	2011,	p.	9-28.	See	also	Panzani,	Luciano,	The	 Italian	Bankruptcy	Law	Reform	
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bis	Law.94	The	Prodi-bis	Law applied	to	companies	that	have	(i)	debts	equal	to	two-
thirds	 of	 both	 the	 assets	 and	 the	 ordinary	 gross	 profits	 shown	 in	 a	 company’s	 last	
fiscal	 year	financial	 statement;	 and	 (ii)	more	 than	200	 employees	 in	 the	 last	 fiscal	
year.	A	few	years	 later,	 in	 the	last	days	of	2003,	Italy	was	the	scene	of	collapse	of	
the Parmalat group.95	While	none	of	 the	 restructuring	 instruments	was	adequate	 to	
handle	such	complex	bankruptcy,	the	Marzano	Law96	was	introduced	with	“special”	
EA	procedure	for	“very	large”	corporations.	Its	most	significant	amendment	was	the	
Alitalia	Decree,97	because	of	the	state	of	insolvency	of	the	national	air	carrier	Alitalia,	
offering	a	special	restructuring	tool	for	providers	of	public	services.98	While	Prodi-bis	
procedures	can	be	started	by:	the	creditor,	debtor,	public	prosecutor	or	the	court,	only	
the	debtor	can	initiate	the	Marzano	procedure.99	From	the	formal	standpoint,	under	the	
EA	insolvency	proceedings	are	separate	and	distinct	for	each	legal	entity	of	the	group,	
but	are	coordinated	on	a	common	basis.100 
The	 Marzano	 law	 applied	 to	 large	 businesses	 that	 cumulatively	 fulfill	 the	
following	 criteria:	 an	 actual	 prospect	 of	 recovery,	 by	 way	 of	 an	 economic	 and	
financial	 restructuring	 of	 the	 business	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 restructuring	 plan	 whose	
duration	cannot	be	more	than	2	years	or	through	a	transfer	of	the	company’s	assets,	
a	minimum	of	500	employees	for	at	least	one	year	and	debts,	including	obligations	
arising	from	guarantees,	for	an	aggregate	amount	not	lower	than	€	300	million.	Once	
the	company	has	been	admitted	to	the	procedure,	no	individual	action	may	be	brought	
by	any	creditor.	
The	Marzano	Law	 represented	 a	 significant	 break	with	 the	punitive	 tradition	
of	 Italian	bankruptcy	 law,	while	 for	 the	first	 time	 the	 law	was	designed	 to	 favor	a	
composition	of	 the	agreements	between	 the	debtor	and	 its	creditors.101	 In	case	of	a	
group	of	companies,	once	the	parent	company	has	been	admitted	to	the	EA,	the	other	
insolvent	companies	belonging	to	the	same	group	may	be	involved	in	such	insolvency	
procedure	as	well,	even	if	they	do	not	meet	the	above	dimensional	and	indebtedness	
Act	 III,	Norton	Annual	Review	of	 International	 Insolvency,	2009,	pp.	301-310,	where	autor	
highlights	the	main	purposes	of	the	reform	of	Italian	Insolvency	Law.	
94 Legislative	Decree	No.	270	of	8	July	1999.
95 For	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 Parmalat	 case	 see	 Kaufman	Aaron	M.,	 The	 European	 Union	 goes	
COMI-tose:	Hazards	of	harmonizing	corporate	insolvency	laws	in	the	global	economy,	Houston	
Journal	of	International	Law,	Vol.	29,	No.	3,	2007,	pp.	626-632.
96 Legislative	Decree	No.	347	of	23	December	2003,	and	Law	No.	39	of	18	February	2004.
97 Legislative	Decree	No.	134	of	28	August	2008.
98 Piergrossi,	Alberto,	Restructurings	and	reorganizations	in	Italy,	Extraordinary	Administration	v.	
Bankruptcy:	The	Italian	Way	to	Economic	Relief	of	Large	Companies	in	Distress,	International	
Insolvency	Institute,	Tenth	Annual	International	Insolvency	Conference	Rome,	Italy	June	7-8,	
2010,	 p.	 1-11,	 available	 at	 https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/Alberto_Piergrossi.pdf	
(20	June	2018).	
99 Panzani,	L.,	op.	cit.,	p.	323.
100 Gianni	et	al.,	The	new	extraordinary	administration	proceedings	for	large	insolvent	companies	
in	Italy,	p.	1,	available	at	http://www.gop.it/doc_pubblicazioni/19_kdnktppfn9_ita.pdf	(22	June	
2018).	
101 Manganelli,	 P.,	 op.	 cit.,	 p.	 242.	 Beye,	 Mema,	 Nasr,	 Joanna, Repaying	 creditors	 without	
imprisoning	debtors,	available	at http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/
Documents/Reforms/Case-Studies/2008/DB08-CS-Italy.pdf	(22	June	2018).
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requirements.	In	particular,	the	notion	of	the	group	of	companies	includes	also	those	
companies	which	are	linked	in	a	substantially	exclusive	way	–	by	contractual	relations	
with	the	company	admitted	to	the	EA	for	the	supplying	of	services	necessary	to	the	
performance	of	their	relevant	activities.102 
The	EA	is	a	debtor	not-in-possession	proceeding.	The	company	willing	to	enter	
the	EA	files	both	an	application	with	the	Italian	Ministry	for	Economic	Development	
(hereinafter:	MED)	and	a	petition	to	the	bankruptcy	court.	A	petition	for	the	insolvency	
declaration	 is	 a	 condition	 for	 admission	 to	 the	EA.	Once	 the	 company	 enters	 into	
EA,	one	or	more	extraordinary	commissioners	are	appointed	by	the	MED.	The	Court	
ascertains	the	state	of	insolvency	of	the	company.103	The	extraordinary	commissioners	
have	 the	 same	powers	 and	duties	 as	 trustees	 in	 bankruptcy	 proceedings.	Once	 the	
insolvent	company	is	admitted	to	the	EA,	creditors	are	no	longer	entitled	to	initiate	or	
continue	any	enforcement	or	cautionary	proceedings.104	However	it	is	not	clear	does	
the	rule	apply	to	all	creditors,	irrespective	whether	claims	have	arisen	before	or	after	
the	insolvent	company	is	admitted	to	the	EA.
The	extraordinary	commissioner	is	the	one	who	should	file	a	restructuring	plan	
within	180	days	of	his/her	appointment,	to	be	implemented	either	through	financial	
restructuring	or	an	assets	 sale.	This	period	may	be	extended	 for	a	 further	90	days.	
The	extraordinary	commissioner	may	provide,	as	part	of	the	restructuring	plan,	the	
payment	of	creditors	 through	composition	agreement,	 i.e.	an	agreement	among	 the	
debtor	 company	 and	 the	 creditors.	 The	 procedure	 ends	 when	 its	 goals	 have	 been	
achieved,	i.e.	when	the	company,	after	the	implementation	of	the	plan,	is	in	a	sound	
financial	position.	Otherwise,	the	company	will	be	declared	insolvent	pursuant	to	the	
Bankruptcy	Act.
The	most	notable	characteristic	of	the	Marzano	Law	is	the	renewed	composition	
agreement	procedure	(Concordato	procedure).	Creditors	are	divided	in	classes,	subject	
to different treatments. Concordato	must	be	accepted	by	creditors	 representing	 the	
majority	of	allowed	claims.	If	different	classes	of	creditors	are	formed,	concordato 
should	be	voted	for	by	the	creditors	representing	the	majority	of	allowed	claims	in	
each	class.	Secured	creditors	are	allowed	to	vote	if	they	give	up	all	or	part	of	their	
security	 rights;	 if	 so,	 they	 can	vote	 only	 in	 proportion	 to	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 claim	
that	subsequently	becomes	unsecured.	This	instrument	was	successfully	used	in	the	
Parmalat	case	for	the	first	time,	whereas	the	reform	of	ordinary	insolvency	procedure	
that	followed	during	the	period	2005-2007	was	influenced	by	it.105 
While	the	first	version	of	Marzano	law	was	enacted	in	the	wake	of	the	Parmalat	
case,	 and	 its	 amendment	promptly	 followed	because	of	Alitalia	group	of	company	
insolvency,106	more	 recently	 the	EA	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 Ittierre	 group,	 one	 of	 the	
leading	payers	in	the	luxury	goods	sector,	that	designs,	produces	and	distributes	high-
102 Gianni	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p. 1.
103 Ibid.,	p.	2.	
104 Loc.	cit.
105 Azzarà,	A.,	Manganelli,	P.,	Klimbacher,	S.,	Italy	-	The	Marzano	Law:	a	Special	Procedure	for	
Large	Insolvent	Companies,	Analysis	of	the	Amendments	Brought	by	the	Alitalia	Case,	p.	2,	
available	at	https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/1134.pdf	(22	June	2018).	
106 D’Ambrosio,	A.,	op.	cit.,	p.	79-83.
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quality	products	under	fully	owned	brands	such	as	Gianfranco	Ferré,	Malo	and	Extè	
or	under	license	agreement	such	as	Just	Cavalli,	VJC	Versace,	Galliano	etc.107 
According	 to	 some	 authors	 and	 their	 findings108	 there	 were	 360	 companies	
subject	 to	 Marzano	 and	 Prodi-bis	 law.	 Thereof	 215	 companies	 were	 part	 of	 73	
business	groups	and	employed	39,119	people.	 In	49	 (out	of	73)	of	 these	cases	 the	
companies	were	 sold	 to	 third	 parties	 and	 15,343	 employees	were	 transferred.	The	
other	145	companies,	which	employed	32,191	workers,	were	part	of	large	enterprise	
groups.	15,980	of	these	employees	were	relocated	in	the	transferring	companies.	Other	
sources	reveal	that	if	the	companies	under	EA	were	sorted	by	a	descending	number	of	
“depending	persons”,	the	first	ten	in	EA	sorted	that	way,	ended	with	transfer	(cession)	
or	restructuring	(ristrutturazione)	and	none	of	these	ended	with	liquidation.109	A	closer	
look	into	the	biggest	Italian	EA	(Alitalia	group)	reveals	that	Alitalia	-	Societa’	Aerea	
Italiana	S.p.a.	newly	entered	 in	EA	by	Ministerial	Decree	of	May,	2,	2017	and	 its	
group	of	companies	(Alitalia	Servizi	S.p.a.,	Alitalia	Airport	S.p.a.,	Alitalia	Express	
S.p.a.	and	Volare	S.p.a.)	are	also	admitted	into	EA.	Namely,	Alitalia	was	put	under	EA	
again	in	2017	after	its	staff	rejected	a	plan	to	cut	jobs	and	salaries.110	Lufthansa,	British	
low-cost	carrier	EasyJet	and	U.S.	private	equity	fund	Cerberus	are	among	companies	
that	have	expressed	an	interest	in	Alitalia,	but	the	restructured	“NewAlitalia”	in	their	
opinion	should	be	smaller	in	terms	of	both	staff	and	its	fleet.111
The	flexibility	of	the	EA	that	allows	the	company	debtor	to	carry	out	its	business	
was	described	as	 the	main	advantage	of	 the	(amended)	Marzano	 law.	On	the	other	
hand,	less	transparent	private	negotiations,	substantial	political	involvement,	weaker	
role	of	creditors	due	to	their	lack	of	involvement	in	the	restructuring	plan	and	ability	
to	sell	business	units	even	before	declaring	state	of	insolvency	were	underlined	as	the	
main	disadvantages	of	the	(amended)	Marzano	law.112 The above mentioned authors 
expressed	the	need	to	unify,	simplify	and	harmonize	that	part	of	the	law,	because,	while	
the	Prodi	law	applies	to	medium-	and	large-sized	insolvent	companies,	the	amended	
Marzano	law	applies	to	large-sized	insolvent	companies,	therefore,	the	unification	of	
those	two	laws	would	create	a	clearer	and	simplified	system	in	which	professionals,	
creditors	 and	 distressed	 investors	 can	 operate.113	 The	model	 in	 question	 has	 three	
submodels:	EA	for	large	corporations	(Prodi-bis	Law),	EA	for	very	large	corporations	
(Marzano	Law)	and	EA	for	very	large	corporations	offering	public	services	(Alitalia	
Law).	Although	the	restructuring	of	Alitalia	group	is	still	not	a	finished	story,	it	poses	
serious	 doubt	 as	 to	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 state	 driven	 and	 assisted	 restructuring	
107 Gianni	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p. 1. 
108 Ghia,	L.,	op.	cit.,	p.	8.	Danovi,	A.,	op.	cit.,	p.	62.	
109 Pellerone,	 G.,	 Gli	 strumenti	 a	 disposizione	 delle	 imprese in crisi per la salvaguardia della 
continuità	 aziendale:	 una	 valutazione	 comparativa	 attraverso	 case	 studies,	 University	 del	
Piemonte	Orientale,	Dipartimento	di	studi	per	l’economia	el’impresa,	2014,	p.	45.
110 See	more	at	http://www.alitaliaamministrazionestraordinaria.it/	(10	April	2018).
111 Wissenbach,	I.,	Exclusive:	Lufthansa	CEO	calls	for	significant	Alitalia	cuts	–	letter,	available	at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alitalia-m-a-lufthansa-exclusive/exclusive-lufthansa-ceo-
calls-for-significant-alitalia-cuts-letter-idUSKBN1F01RW	(12	January	2018).
112 Azzarà,	A.,	Manganelli,	P.,	Klimbacher,	S.,	op.	cit.,	p.	3.	
113 Ibid.,	p.	4.	
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procedure.114 
3. THE CROATIAN (PREVENTIVE) RESTRUCTURING LAW
The	legislative	history	of	the	Croatian	pre-insolvency	restructuring	procedure	is	
not	a	lengthy	one.	The	pre-insolvency	settlement	was	introduced	by	the	Law	on	the	
financial	operation	and	pre-insolvency	settlement.115	Underlying	the	said	legislative	
experiment	 was	 a	 wrongful	 assumption	 that	 acute	 nonliquidity	 and	 insolvency	
crisis	 of	 domestic	 companies	 could	 be	 solved	 by	 construing	 a	 separate	 law.116 It 
was	 a	 combination	of	 an	 administrative	 and	 court	 proceedings	with	 the	 court	 as	 a	
rather	 formal	verificator	of	 the	 restructuring	plan.117	Due	 to	 serious	 inconsistencies	
with	 existing	 insolvency	 laws	 and	 criticism	 in	 the	 process	 of	 the	 implementation	
of	 that	 law,	 this	 preventive	 reorganization	 tool	was	 thoroughly	 reformed	 in	 2015.	
With	 implementation	of	 the	 new	2015	 Insolvency	Act	 (hereinafter:	 IA	2015),	 pre-
insolvency	 procedure	 superseded	 the	 abandoned	 pre-insolvency	 settlement.	 That	
substantial	 novelty	 was	 considered	 as	 the	 regulatory	 response118 to 2014/135/EU 
Commission	 Recommendation	 of	 12	March	 2014	 on	 a	 new	 approach	 to	 business	
failure	 and	 insolvency.119	 Pre-insolvency	 procedure	 was,	 inter alia,	 put	 back	 into	
the	hands	of	 the	 (commercial)	court.	 Imminent	 insolvency	 (prijeteća nesposobnost 
za plaćanje)	was	 introduced	 as	 a	 reason	 to	propose	 the	opening	of	pre-insolvency	
procedure.	Except	pre-insolvency	debtor,	eligible	petitioners	were	also	creditors	but	
only	 if	 the	 debtor	 had	 consented	 to	 that.120	When	 filing	 the	 proposal	 to	 open	 pre-
insolvency	 proceedings,	 a	 restructuring	 plan121	 should	 be	 attached	 accordingly.122 
Although	the	IA	2015	-	in	terms	of	provisions	on	determination	of	voting	rights	of	
creditors	and	voting	majority	necessary	for	the	acceptance	of	the	restructuring	plan	
-	provided	 that	 the	 rules	applicable	 to	 the	 insolvency	plan	apply	by	analogy,123 the 
restructuring	plan	departed	from	its	role-model,	i.e.	the	insolvency	plan	and	the	law	
was	silent	on	the	cram-down	rule.124 
Several	drawbacks	were	noticed	in	the	pre-insolvency	proceedings	even	after	
the	major	IA	2015	reform.	Creditors	were	deprived	of	their	representing	body	in	the	
114 Grigò,	E.,	Oglio,	L.,	The	Alitalia	Decree:	How	Insolvency	Affects	Antitrust	Law,	Insolvency	
and	Restructuring	International,	Vol.	4,	No.	2,	2010,	p.	20.	
115 Zakon	o	financijskom	poslovanju	 i	 predstečajnoj	nagodbi,	Official	Gazette,	 108/12,	144/12,	
81/13,	112/13,	71/15,	78/15.
116 Miladin,	P.,	Markovinović,	H.,	Stečajni	plan	i	nagodba	u	postupku	izvanredne	uprave,	Zbornik	
56.	susreta	pravnika,	Opatija	2018,	Hrvatski	savez	udruga	pravnika	u	gospodarstvu,	Zagreb,	
2018,	p.	68.
117 Dika,	M.,	Predstečajni	postupak,	Pravo	u	gospodarstvu,	No.	3,	2016,	p.	368.
118 Garašić,	J.,	Najznačajnije	novine	Stečajnog	zakona	iz	2015.	godine,	Zbornik	Pravnog	fakulteta	
Sveučilišta	u	Rijeci,	Vol.	38,	No.	1,	2017,	p.	140.
119 OJ	L	74,	14.3.2014.,	p.	65–70.
120 Art.	25	par.	1	Inslovency	Act	2015.
121 Mandatory	elements	of	the	plan	are	provided	in	Art.	27	IA.
122 Art.	26.	Insolvency	Act	2015,	see:	Dika,	M.,	op.	cit.,	p.	388.
123 Art.	56	of	Insolvency	Act.
124 Garašić,	J.,	op.	cit.,	p.	143.
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pre-insolvency	proceedings	while	the	judge	and	trustee	were	sole	procedural	bodies.125 
A	functional	distinction	between	the	pre-insolvency	plan	and	insolvency	plan	was	not	
clearly	confined.126	Likewise,	the	legal	position	of	the	providers	of	new	money	loans	
was	not	made	clear,	 although	 the	 latter	drawback	was	clarified	by	virtue	of	 a	new	
Article	62.a	in	IA	2017	Amendment	of	the	2015	Insolvency	Act.127
Unlike	 the	 pre-insolvency	 restructuring	 plan,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 main	
insolvency	 reorganization	 tool	 called	 the	 “insolvency	 plan”	 (stečajni plan), dates 
back	to	1996	reform	of	the	Croatian	insolvency	law	and	was	inspired	by	the	German	
Insolvenzplan	and	left	substantionally	unaltered	by	the	IA	2015	reform.128
At	the	beginning	of	2017,	Croatia	witnessed	the	financial	distress	of	the	Agrokor	
group.	As	a	fast-track	salvatory	measure	it	 introduced	the	tailor-made	restructuring	
law	for	(group	of)	companies	of	systemic	significance	–	i.	e.	EAPA,	creating	for	the	
second	time	a	legal	experiment	outside	the	scope	of	the	main	insolvency	law.129 The 
problem	of	insolvency	or	insolvency-like	status	of	the	large	(group	of)	companies	is	
very	well	known	in	practice,	although	the	question	whether	 they,	due	 to	 their	size,	
pose	a	systemic	risk	has	not	been	unanimously	answered.	It	has	been	observed	that	
such	intervention	would	be	justified	only	in	case if	it	seriously	threatened	the	collapse	
of	the	entire	financial	system.130	However,	opinions	have	been	voiced	that	“ongoing-
liquidity-state-guarantee”	 is	 de facto provided	 for	 socially	 “too-important-to-fail”	
125 Ibid.,	p.	142.
126 Dika,	M.,	op.	cit.,	p.	425.
127 The	mentioned	 article	 ensures	 priority	 to	 providers	 of	 the	 new	money	 (based	 on	 previous	
agreement	reached	between	debtor	and	creditors	who	hold	more	than	two	thirds	of	the	legally	
approved	claims).	The	new	money	creditors	shall	be	given	priority	before	the	other	insolvency	
creditors,	except	for	the	creditors	of	the	“first	higher	payment	rank”	(i.	e.	employees	and	former	
employees’	claims).	According	to	par.	7	of	the	same	new	article	this	“new	money	creditors”	
are	protected	 from	avoidance	actions	based	on	 the	grounds	of	“non-equal”	or	“preferential”	
treatment	of	the	creditors.
128 The	right	to	file	the	insolvency	plan	belongs	to	debtor	but	it	should	be	accompanied	with	the	
petition	to	open	insolvency	procedure.	If	insolvency	procedure	is	already	opened,	insolvency	
administrator	has	also	the	right	to	file	the	plan,	but	this	can	be	ordered	to	insolvency	administrator	
also	by	creditors’	assembly.	Creditors	are	divided	in	classes	and	every	class	votes	separately	
for	the	plan.	The	required	majority	within	a	class	is	accomplished	if	the	value	of	the	claims	of	
the	creditors	who	voted	for	the	plan	exceeded	twice	the	value	of	the	claims	of	the	creditors	who	
voted	against	it	(absent	creditors	are	not	considered	in	calculation).	The	plan	could	not	place	
any	creditor	into	a	worse	position	than	that	the	creditor	would	face	if	the	plan	didn’t	exist	(art.	
337	IA).	The	law	has	cram	down	rule	(protects	majority	from	disenting	minority).	Namely,	if	a	
voting	group	has	not	accepted	the	plan	with	the	required	majority,	the	majority	is	deemed	to	be	
accomplished	if	following	conditions	are	cumulatively	met:	(a)	the	creditors	in	that	group	are	
not	in	placed	in	a	position	worse	than	if	the	plan	would	not	exist,	(b)	they	should	adequately	
participate	 in	 the	economic	benefits	of	 the	plan	and	(c)	 if	majority	of	 the	voting	groups	has	
accepted	the	plan	with	the	required	majority	(art.	331	in	relation	to	330/1	IA).	The	plan	must	
be	accepted	by	creditors	and	debtor	 (334/1)	before	confirmed	by	 the	court’s	 resolution.	The	
court’s	confirmation	of	 the	plan	has	erga	omnes	effect.	The	court	has	monitoring	powers	 in	
implementation of the plan.
129 Miladin,	P.,	Markovinović,	H.,	op.	cit.,	p.	68.
130 In	this	vein	for	Croatian	law	see:	Garašić,	J.,	Izvanredna	uprava	nad	povezanim	društvima,	cit.,	
p. 11.
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non-financial	 institutions	 such	 as	 major	 hospitals,	 utility	 providers	 or	 even	 major	
employers.131	Therefore,	it	remains	an	open	question	whether	the	business	failure	of	
a	major	employer	or	major	utility	provider	justifies	state	intervention	and/or	requires	
tailor-made	solutions,	especially	if	“systemic	significance”	is	the	underlying	concept	
of the EAPA.
In	 the	 explanatory	part	 of	 the	 legislative	proposal	 on	EAPA	 the	Government	
stated:	 “systemic	 risk	 (…)	 arises	 from	 the	 number	 of	 employed	 persons,	 business	
relationship	with	other	business	 subjects	 in	economy,	business	 ramifications	 in	 the	
entire	territory	of	the	Republic	of	Croatia	and/or	dominant	economic	position	in	the	
part	of	 the	 territory	of	 the	Republic	of	Croatia”.132	However,	 the	 said	proposal	did	
not	offer	a	method	for	measurement	of	systemic	risk,	it	merely	stated	the	number	of	
employees	and	amount	of	 liability	as	 thresholds	 that	should	 imply	the	existence	of	
“systemic	significance”.	Yet,	a	systemic	risk	is	a	measurable	category.	In	fact,	there	
are	 many	 specialized	 tools	 that	 allow	 for	 comprehensive	 assessment	 of	 systemic	
risk,	from	complementary	perspective	including	banks	and	non-banks.133 As a result 
of	 the	underlying	“systemic	significance”	concept,	 it	 is	possible	 that	companies	do	
generate	a	systemic	risk	–	even	if	they	do	not	fulfil	the	respective	requirements,	and	
vice	versa,	i.e.	companies	that	fulfil	requirements	need	not	pose	systemic	risk,	but	are	
still	admitted	to	EA	procedure.
Adopted	in	a	fast-track	parliamentary	procedure,	the	EAPA	was	heavily	criticized	
in	many	 aspects.	The	 excessiveness	 of	 state	 intervention,	 absence	 of	 requirements	
related	to	formal	qualification	of	a	person	who	will	act	as	the	extraordinary	trustee,	
absence	of	firm	procedural	rules	ensuring	the	protection	of	substantial	rights	of	the	
creditor,	 especially	 minor	 and	 medium	 creditors,	 the	 breach	 of	 the	 fundamental	
principle	of	insolvency	law	which	calls	for	the	equality	of	legal	position	of	the	creditors,	
their	right	to	influence	the	composition	of	the	bodies	relevant	for	rendering	decisions	
have	been	pinpointed	as	the	most	critical	points.134	Twelwe	petitioners	hence	required	
judicial	review	of	EAPA	before	the	Constitutional	Court	of	the	Republic	of	Croatia.	
In	 its	182	pages	 long	decision	 (not	 rendered	unanimously),	 the	Court discussed	 in	
length	all	of	these	alleged	unconstitutional	elements	of	EAPA,	but	in	the	end	rejected	
petitions	for	review.	Although	the	mentioned	allegation	warrants	further	elaboration	
from	the	perspective	of	insolvency	laws,	but	this	paper	will	only	focus	on	the	EAPA’s	
concept	of	“a	company	of	systemic	significance	to	the	Republic	of	Croatia”,	since	it	
defines	the ratione personae	application	of	the	law.
131 See	generally:	Azgad-Tromer,	S.,	Too	Important	to	Fail:	Bankruptcy	versus	Bailout	of	Socially	
Important	Non-Financial	Institutions,	Harvard	Business	Law	Review,	Vol.	7,	2017.	p.	164-169,	
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2551237	(20	June	2018).	
132 As	quoted	in	the	explanatory	part	of	the	Decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	of	the	Republic	of	
Croatia,	2nd	May	2018,	p.	4.	
133 Cortes,	F.,	Lindner,	P.,	Malik,	S.,	Segoviano,	M.	A.,	A	Comprehensive	Multi-Sector	Tool	for	
Analysis	of	Systemic	Risk	and	Interconnectedness	(SyRIN),	IMF	Working	Paper,	WP/18/14,	
International	 Monetary	 Fund,	 2018,	 pp.	 1-46.	 The	 paper	 elaborates	 the	 tool	 (SyRIN)	 that	
produces	various	metrics	to	evaluate	systemic	risk	from	complementary	perspectives,	including	
tail	 risk,	 cross-entity	 interconnectedness	 and	 the	 contribution	 to	 systemic	 risk	 by	 different	
entities	and	sectors.	
134 Garašić,	J.,	op.	cit.,	p.	5	et	seq.
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This	notion	is	defined	in	Art.	4	(2)	EAPA.	It	is	a	joint-stock	company	(and	not	
a	company	with	limited	liability,	or	any	other	type	of	company!)	which	individually	
or	 together	 with	 its	 subsidiaries	 or	 affiliates,	 cumulatively	 meets	 the	 condition	
consisting	in	the	number	of	employees	and	amount	of	balance	sheet	liablities.	As	to	
the	first	threshold,	the	company	should	individually	or	together	with	its	subsidiaries	
or	affiliates	in	the	calendar	year	preceeding	the	year	in	which	the	proposal	for	opening	
an	EA	procedure	has	been	submitted,	employ	more	than	5,000	employees	on	average.	
As	 to	 the	 second	 threshold, the	 existing	 balance	 sheet	 liabilities	 alone	 or	 together	
with	their	subsidiaries	or	affiliated	companies	should	amount	to	more	than	7,5	billion	
of	HRK	 (aprox.	 1€	 billlion)	 or,	 in	HRK	 counter	 value,	 if	 denominated	 in	 another	
currency	(at	 the	day	of	submission	of	proposals	for	opening	of	 the	EA	procedure).	
When	comparing	 the	said	employee	and	liability	 threshold	with	 the	one	applicable	
under	 Italian	 law,	 the	authors	 stress	 that	 the	number	of	 employees	 is	 set	 ten	 times	
higher	at	the	annual	level	in	Croatian	law,	while	the	second	threshold	is	approximately	
three	 times	 higher.	 However,	 while	 the	 Croatian	 employee	 threshold	 takes	 into	
account	 the	number	of	employees	at	 the	 level	of	a	single	company	or	respectively,	
at	the	level	of	the	group,	the	Italian	threshold	is	calculated	at	the	level	of	the	single	
company.135	 The	 existence	 of	 insolvency,	 imminent	 insolvency	 or	 overindebtness	
of	the	company	is	the	legal	ground	to	initiate	EA	proceedings,	while	in	Italian	law	
the	 state	 of	 insolvency	 is	 a	 mandatory	 precondition	 for	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 EA	
proceedings.	When	comparing	the	above	thresholds	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	Italian	is	
tied	to	the	concept	of	a	very	large	company	(and	from	the	Alitalia	decree	to	companies	
that	provide	public	services),	while	the	Croatian	does	not	rely	on	the	concept	of	large	
company,	but	a	company	which	is	capable	of	creating	a	systemic	risk.	As	explained	
in	the	Government	Proposal	this	is	a	type	of	company	whose	“uncontrolled	collapse”	
can	 cause	 a	 “chain	 reaction”	 and	 could	 “seriously	 jeopardize	 the	 entire	 Croatian	
economic	system”.136	It	implies	a	possibility	to	generate	systemic	risk,	which	is	linked	
primarily	to	banks	or	to	non-banking	financial	institutions	such	as	investment	funds,	
hedge	funds	and	as	of	recently,	even	insurance	sector	companies.	However,	as	already	
mentioned,	systemic	risk	is	an	event	which	could	have	important	consequences	on	the	
entire	economic	system,	but	nevertheless	a	measurable	category.	Therefore,	setting	up	
the	“number	of	employees”	and	“amount	of	liabilities”	as	relevant	criteria	for	ratione 
personae	application	has	two	drawbacks.	It	unjustifiably	excludes	companies	that	are	
not	 of	 that	 “size”,	 but	 are	 otherwise	 capable	of	 generating	 systemic	 risk,	 and	vice	
versa	“targeted”	companies	admitted	in	tailor-made	state-assisted	procedure,	do	not	
necessarily	need	to	generate	a	systemic	risk	which	is	the	implied	term	under	EAPA.	
Therefore,	the	authors	find	that	the	notion	“company	of	systemic	significance”	should	
not	be	the	underlying	concept	of	this	law.
Another	 important	 difference	 between	 the	 Italian	 and	 Croatian	 law	 is	 the	
135 There	are	announcements	 that	 the	number	of	employees	at	 the	group	level	 in	 the	 legislative	
reform	would	increase	to	“at	least	800	employees”.	See	Manganelli,	P.,	Chiarugi,	A.	G.,	The	
proposed	in-depth	reform	of	the	Italian	extraordinary	administration	proceedings,	available	at:	
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/the-proposed-in-depth-reform-
of--the-italian-extraordinary-administration-proceedings/	(28	June	2018).
136 Decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	of	the	Republic	of	Croatia,	2	May	2018,	p.	4.
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involvement	of	 affiliated	companies	 into	 the	EA	of	 the	main	company.	 In	 Italy,	 in	
case	 of	 a	 group	 of	 companies,	 once	 the	 parent	 company	has	 been	 admitted	 to	 the	
EA,	 the	 other	 insolvent	 companies	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 group	may	 be	 involved	
in	such	insolvency	procedure,	even	though	they	do	not	meet	the	above	dimensional	
and	 indebtedness	 requirements.	The	notion	of	 “group	of	 companies”	 includes	 also	
those	companies	which	are	 linked,	 in	a	substantially	exclusive	way,	by	contractual	
relations	with	the	company	admitted	to	the	EA	for	the	supplying	of	services	necessary	
to	the	performance	of	the	relevant	activities.	In	that	sense	the	Italian	concept	of	related	
company	 is	wider,	while	 it	 relies	 not	 only	on	 the	 concept	 of	 control	 of	 the	 parent	
company,	 but	 also	 involves	 companies	 that	 are	 suppliers	 of	 “substantial	 goods	 or	
services”	to	the	company	admitted	to	the	EA.	Indeed,	the	last	revision	of	the	Italian	
law	has	designed	EA	as	a	special	restructuring	tool	for	providers	of	public	services.137 
Providers	of	public	services,	also	sometimes	called	providers	of	services	of	general	
economic	interests	are	the	type	of	economic	activity	that	deserve	special	treatment,	in	
light	of	the	fact	that	the	delivery	of	such	services	is	essential	for	citizens.	Nevertheless,	
providers	of	SGEI	and	companies	in	difficulties	both	have	access	to	particular	state	
aid.138	 When	 comparing	 the	 Italian	 and	 Croatian	 concept	 of	 affiliated	 companies	
eligible	to	be	admitted	into	the	EA,	the	Croatian	solution	is	based	on	the	concept	of	
control	(at	 least	25%	share	capital	 in	depending/related	company	is	held	by	major/
parent	company),	while	the	Italian	is	more	a	“single	economic	entity”	approach.	
Under	Croatian	 law,	 affiliated	 companies	must	 be	 involved	 in	 the	EA	of	 the	
main	company	if	they	are:	depending	companies	(ovisno društvo) in the sense of Art. 
475	of	the	Companies	Act	or	related	companies	(povezano društvo). In order to be 
admitted	to	the	EA	of	the	main/parent	company,	depending	or	related	company	should	
be	established	according	to	Croatian	law	and	have	its	seat	in	Croatia,	and	the	main/
parent	company	should	hold	in	it	at	least	25%	of	the	shares.	The	main	drawback	in	
this	respect	is	that	related/dependent	companies	will	be	involved	in	the	EA,	whether	
insolvent	or	not.	That	is	a	corollary	of	the	provision	under	Art.	4	EAPA	which	clearly	
states	that	the	EA	procedure	will	be	instituted	regardless	of	fulfiling	the	state	of	(pre)
137 The	concept	is	close	to	“services	of	general	economic	interest”.	Services	of	general	economic	
interest	 (SGEI)	are	economic	activities	 that	public	authorities	 identify	as	being	of	particular	
importance	to	citizens	and	that	would	not	be	supplied	(or	would	be	supplied	under	different	
conditions)	 if	 there	 were	 no	 public	 intervention.	 Examples	 are	 transport	 networks,	 postal	
services	and	social	services.	They	have	special	state	aid	regime.	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
state_aid/overview/public_services_en.html.	See	more:	Liszt,	M.,	Čulinović-Herc,	E.,	Certain	
Aspects	of	State	Aid	to	Services	of	General	Economic	Interest,	in:	Tomljenović,	V.,	Bodiroga-
Vukobrat,	N.,	Butorac	Malnar,	V.,	Kunda	I.,	(eds),	EU	Competition	and	State	Aid	Rules	Public	
and	Private	Enforcement,	vol.	3,	Springer,	Berlin,	Heidelberg,	2017,	pp.	291-313.	
138 On	state	aid	from	companies	in	difficulties	–	i.e.	rescue	and	restructuring	state	aid	see:	Obradović	
Mazal,	T.,	Butorac	Malnar,	V.,	The	Discretionary	Power	of	Competent	Authorities	in	Applying	
State	Aid	Rules	on	Rescue	and	Restructuring,	Potocan,	V.	Kalinic,	P.	Vuletic,	A.	 (eds.),	26th 
International	Scientific	Conference	on	Economic	and	Social	Development	-	Building	Resilient	
Society,	Conference	Proceedings,	Varaždin,	2017,	p.	599-607.	Obradović	Mazal,	T.,	Čulinović-
Herc,	E.,	New	rules	for	rescuing	and	restructuring	state	aid	-	sharing	burden	of	present	to	share	
gains	 of	 future,	 SGEM	 2015	 Conference	 Proceedings	 on	 Political	 Sciences,	 Law,	 Finance,	
Economics	&	Tourism,	Book	2,	Vol.	1,	2015,	pp.	615–622.	
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insolvency	of	dependant	or	related	company	of	the	main	company.139 The involvment 
of	solvent	members	of	the	group	should	depend	on	consent	of	the	respective	solvent	
member,	since	the	legal	interests	of	the	respective	company’s	creditors	should	also	be	
protected.140
The	 involvement	 of	 a	 group	 of	 companies	 in	 the	 EA	 and	 envisaged	 “single	
settlement	 approach”	 for	 the	 main/parent	 company	 with	 all	 its	 depending/related	
companies	 (Art.	 42.	 (6)	 EAPA),	 opens	 the	 question	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	
consolidation	intended	in	the	EAPA.	According	to	Garašić,	EAPA	opted	for	substantive	
consolidation	 -	which	 allows	 the	 creation	of	 one	 single	 estate	 liable	 for	 all	 claims	
of	 all	 creditors	 of	 respective	members	 of	 the	 group	 (coupled	with	 involvement	 of	
the	dependent	companies	in	the	EA	irrespective	of	their	solvency	status).	In	opinion	
of	 Garašić	 by	 opening	 the	 door	 to	 substantive	 consolidation,	 the	 law	 abandoned	
the	principle	of	 legal	 separability	–	 the	principle	which	calls	 that	each	 legal	entity	
with	regard	 to	his	obligation	should	be	 liable	with	 its	own	assets	 therefore	 leading	
to	 an	 unjustified	 lifting	 of	 the	 corporate	 veil,	which	 is	 extremely	 rarely	 permitted	
in	 insolvency	 law.141	 Miladin	 and	 Markovinović	 consider	 that	 EAPA	 should	 be	
interpereted	so	as	to	allow	only	procedural	consolidation,	because	other	interpretation	
(i.e.	substantive	consolidation)	would	be	difficult	to	justifiy	from	the	constitutional-
law	point	of	view	and	would	cause	a	serious	departure	from	the	fundamental	principle	
of	private	law	whereby	every	person	should	be	liable	for	its	own	debt	with	its	own	
assets.142	In	the	text	of	the	Settlement	Proposal	that	was	submitted	to	the	Commercial	
Court	in	Zagreb	on	20	June	2018,	it	is	stated	that	extraordinary	administration	will	
be	realized	as	a	concept	of	procedural	consolidation,	“where	each	creditor’s	right	of	
settlement	is	determined	separately	for	each	of	its	claims	filed	against	each	company	
admitted	to	the	EA”.143	Since	the	Settlement	was	rendered	by	required	majority	it	was	
confirmed	by	the	decision	of	the	Court.144	Now,	extraordinary	trustee	should	commence	
a	process	of	its	recognition	and	enforcement	abroad.	This	could	cause	problems	since	
the	recognition	of	the	effects	of	the	initiation	of	the	EA	EAPA	procedure	was	declined	
139 Miladin,	P.,	Markovinović,	H.,	op.	cit.,	p.	97.
140 Garašić,	J.,	op.	cit.,	p.	21.	
141 Loc.	cit.	Author	in	her	article	gives	a	comprehensive	set	of	critical	remarks:	from	wrongfully	
defined	 aim	 of	 the	 law,	 excesivness	 of	 the	 state	 intervention	 and	 insufficient	 rules	 as	 to	
qualifications	and	impartiality	of	the	extraordinary	commissioner	to	the	absence	of	a	satisfactory	
procedural	guarantees	that	protect	substantial	rigths	of	the	creditors	(especially	creditors	with	
minor	and	medium	claims)	as	well	as	violation	of	the	cornerstone	insolvency	principle	which	
calls	 for	 equal	 legal	 position	 of	 insolvency	 debtor’s	 creditors	 and	many	 other	 that	 violates	
fundamental	constitutional	values.	See	in	particular	p.	8-28.
142 Miladin,	P.,	Markovinović,	H.,	op.	cit.,	p.	98.	Authors	base	 their	 interpretation	on	following	
arguments:	a	single	procedure	for	all	companies	in	the	group	is	conducted,	unique	procedural	
bodies	for	all	companies	involved	in	the	process	are	established,	all	creditors	of	all	involved	
entities	 are	united	and	unique	proposal	of	 the	 settlement	 is	 submitted,	but	 the	 law	does	not	
require	unification	of	all	assets	of	all	involved	companies	in	order	to	create	sigle	insolvency	
estate. 
143 Settlement	Proposal	of	20th	June,	2018,	p.	91.
144 Decision	of	the	Commercial	Court	in	Zagreb,	47.	St	–	1138/17	–	28	23	of	6th	July	2018
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in	several	adjacent	jurisdictions:	i.e.	Slovenia,	Bosnia	and	Hercegovina,	Srbija145	with	
the	exception	of	Switzerland,	while	in	England&Wales	the	case	is	still	pending.	The	
competent	court	in	the	UK	has	initially	recognized	the	effects	of	EAPA	as	the	“main	
foreign	proceedings”	according	 to	EIR,	 causing	 the	 stay	of	 all	 actions	of	 creditors	
against	the	debtor	in	England	&	Wales.	While	the	discontented	creditor	demanded	an	
appeal,	the	stay	of	actions	remains	in	force	until	the	final	decision	on	recognition	of	
the	effects	of	EAPA	is	rendered.146 
4. CONCLUSION(S)
Solving	the	(preventive)	restructuring	puzzle	for	(large)	companies	in	distress	is	
not	an	easy	task.	The	here	presented	regulatory	models	differ	markedly	–	from	fast-
track	minimally-court-assisted	 proceedings	 to	 very	 complex	 restructuring	 schemes	
with	massive	state	involvement.	
The	most	 impressive	 feature	of	 the	UK	SoA	model	 is	certainly	 its	predictive	
timeline	 and	 well-established	 course	 of	 actions	 of	 the	 involved	 stakeholders.	 The	
willingness	 of	UK	 courts	 to	 sanction	 the	 particular	 scheme	 even	 if	 the	 respective	
company	 does	 not	 have	 its	 COMI	 in	 the	 UK	 (but	 solely	 selected	 English	 law	 as	
applicable	law),	reveals	a	high	level	regulatory	competition	in	the	domain	of	preventive	
restructuring.	Restructuring	emigration	from	Germany	 to	UK	borders	 to	abuse	and	
forum	 shopping,	 but	 also	 confirms	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 English	 reorganization	
tool.	As	 to	 the	German	PSP	model,	 the	 studies	demonstrate	general	 satisfaction	 in	
regard	to	speediness	of	 the	procedure	and	greater	creditors’	 involvement.	From	the	
normative	point	of	view,	the	PSP	seems	to	fit	very	well	into	the	German	concept	of	
two-stage	 insolvency	 proceedings.	However,	 at	 empirical	 level	 the	 data	 show	 that	
proposals	of	opening	PSP,	after	ESUG	came	into	force,	were	not	made	any	sooner	than	
prior	to	its	enactment,	and	that	there	is	a	relatively	high	rate	of	self-administrations	
that	ended	with	insolvency.	The	management’s	lack	of	competence	was	considered	
as	the	weakest	point	in	PSP	self-administration	proceedings.	As	to	the	Italian	model,	
it	is	worth	emphasizing	that	the	Italian	EA,	through	its	many	changes	brought	about	
three	EA	submodels.	With	a	handful	of	other	available	restructuring	tools,	the	Italian	
preventive	restructuring	law	has	become	extremely	complex.	It	is	important	to	stress	
that	the	EA	in	Italy	is	conducted	in	order	to	preserve	separability	of	each	legal	entity	
of	the	member	of	the	group,	but	coordinated	on	a	common	basis.147 The notion of the 
145 Case	is	still	pending	before	respective	national	constitutional	courts.	
146 Settlement	Proposal	of	20	June,	2018,	p.	49.	
147 That	is	confirmed	as	a	rule	in	the	new	law.	Legge	19	ottobre	2017,	n.	155	Delega	al	Governo	per	
la	riforma	delle	discipline	della	crisi	di	impresa	e	dell’insolvenza.	Official	Gazette,	n.	254	del	
30-10-2017,	available	at	http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/stampa/serie_generale/originario. 
In	Art.	3	(1)	d)	it	is	clearly	stated	that	if	there	is	unified	debt	restructuring	settlement	(un	accordo	
unitario	di	ristrutturazione	dei	debiti)	in	all	cases	the	autonomy	of	respective	active	and	passive	
masses	should	be	respected	(“ferma	restando	in	ogni	caso	l’autonomia	delle	rispettive	masse	
attive	e	passive“).	Moreover	in	Art.	2	per.	2	b)	it	is	stated	that	when	procedure	concentrated	
for	all	members	of	the	group,	simultaneous	and	separate	voting	for	creditors	of	each	company	
should	be	ensured	(“nell’ipotesi	di	gestione	unitaria	della	procedura	di	concordato	preventivo	
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group	of	 companies	 follows	not	 only	 the	 “control”,	 but	 also	 the	 “single	 economic	
entity”	approach.	Since	the	number	of	employees’	threshold	is	set	relatively	low,	the	
number	 of	 companies	 eligible	 to	 be	 admitted	 in	 the	EA	 is	 relatively	 high.	On	 the	
side	of	effectiveness,	 the	available	studies	have	shown	 that	none	of	 the	companies	
admitted	 into	EA	ended	 in	 liquidation,	which	 speaks	 for	general	 efficiency	of	 that	
procedure.	 However,	 repeated	 use	 of	 the	 same	 tool	 in	 case	 of	 identical	 company	
(Alitalia	group)	shows	that	restructuring	problems	could	not	be	solved	“for	all	times”.	
Substantial	political	involvement	and	a	relatively	weak	role	of	creditors	due	to	lack	of	
their	involvement	in	the	restructuring	plan	were	detected	as	the	main	drawbacks	of	the	
EA.	Others	are	calling	for	unification	and	simplification	of	that	part	of	the	insolvency	
law,	especially	because	of	the	mentioned	submodels.	
As	 to	 the	 Croatian	 law,	 a	 few	 conclusions	 seem	 relevant.	 If	 “systemic	
significance”	is	the	key	notion	which	defines	ratione personae	field	of	application	
of	 EAPA,	 then	 it	 should	 be	measured	 differently	 than	 with	 lump-sum	 threshold	
criteria.	 It	would	 be	more	 compatible	with	 its	 Italian	 role-model,	 if	 the	Croatian	
legislator	followed	“large”	or	“very	large	company”	as	a	ratione personae	criterion.	
As	 to	 thresholds,	 the	 number	 of	 employees	 is	 set	 ten	 times	 higher	 than	 in	 the	
corresponding	 Italian	model,	 and	 three	 times	 higher	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 amount	 of	
liablities.	In	terms	of	the	number	of	companies	who	are	de facto	candidates	for	the	
EA,	it	seems	that	in	Croatia	only	ten	groups	of	companies	match	those	criteria,148 
which	renders	it	discriminatory.	On	the	other	hand,	EAPA	is	inherently	incoherent,	
while	 it	unjustifiably	excludes	 the	companies	which	surpass	both	criteria,	but	are	
not	founded	as	a	joint	stock	company	(but	e.g.	a	limited	liability	company),	hence	
additionally	 narrowing	 the	 “systemic	 significance”	 content	 and	 reaffirming	 the	
thesis	that	the	law	was	indeed	tailor-made	for	one	single	(group	of)	company.	
The	procedural	drawbacks	of	EAPA	go	far	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	and	
are	in	length	dicussed	in	one	Constitutional	Court	decision,	as	well	as	criticised	by	
law	 scholars.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	main	 problem	 lies	 behind	 the	 law	 and	 is	 tied	 to	 a	
general	 approach	 towards	 the	 (pre)insolvency	 status	 of	 large	 corporate	 groups.	 In	
addition,	 it	 seems	 that	 tailor-made	 solutions	 are	 needed,	 but	 regulatory	 responses	
vary,	especially	if	the	topic	is	substantial	v.	procedural	consolidation	or	concentration	
v.	 coordination	 approach.	 Croatian	 scholars	 agree	 that	 the	 procedure	 should	 be	
structured	per minimum	 so	as	 to	allow	 the	 separation	of	 legal	personality	 for	each	
member	of	the	group	and	for	the	claim	of	every	creditor	of	each	company.	Substantial	
consolidation	is	not	a	solution.149	Croatian	authors	thus	agree	that	at	least	procedural	
consolidation	 should	 be	 applied,	 but	 support	 a	 coordination	 approach,	 favoured	 in	
the	German	 legislation.150	 Recent	 changes	 in	 Italian	 law	 strongly	 confirm	 that	 the	
di	gruppo	devono	essere	previsti	(…)	la	contemporanea	e	separata	votazione	dei	creditori	di	
ciascuna	impresa”).
148 According	to	Explanatory	part	of	the	Decision	of	Constitutional	Court	of	2	May	2018,	p.	69,	
par. 42.7.
149 Formulating	 agencies	 such	 as	 UNCITRAL	 limit	 substantive	 consolidation	 to	 exceptional	
circumstances.	See	UNCITRAL	legislative	guide	on	insolvency	law:	Part	Three:	Treatment	of	
enterprise	groups	in	insolvency,	New	York,	p.32	Recommendation	202-210.
150 See	Garašić,	J.,	op.	cit.,	p.	20.	Miladin,	P.,	Markovinović,	H.,	p.	98.
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autonomy	of	 respective	active	and	passive	masses	 should	be	observed	 in	group	of	
companies’	restructurings	if	there	is	a	unified	debt	restructuring	settlement.	In	order	
to	 increase	 the	 efficiency	 and	 specialization	 of	 Italian	 courts	 handling	 insolvency	
matters,	 specialized	courts	 adjudicating	corporate-law	matters	 shall	 have	exclusive	
competence	in	EA	proceedings.	
To	conclude,	whether	one-size	fits	all	or	tailor	made	solution	are	appropriate	in	
preventive	restructuring	for	companies	in	difficulty,	authors	are	of	opinion	that	one	
size	fits	all	approach	should	be	observed	without	any	deviation	in	regard	fundamental	
insolvency	 principles.	As	 far	 as	 tailor	made	 approach	 is	 concerned,	 insolvency	 or	
insolvency-like	status	of	corporate	groups	certainly	requires	tailor	made	solutions	-	
either	by	using	concentration	or	coordination	approach	and	not	material	consolidation,	
but	in	any	case	respecting	the	principle	of	legal	certainty.	Therefore,	any	new	piece	
of	 legislation	 in	 the	 field	 of	 preventive	 restructuring	 should	 be	 aligned	with	 basic	
principles	in	the	existing	insolvency	laws.	However,	on	the	basis	of	the	results	of	the	
empirical	 studies	 regarding	 efficiency	 of	 analyzed	 regulatory	models,	 authors	 find	
that	even	when	the	new	law	is	perfectly	matching	into	the	system,	it	would	not	be	as	
effective	as	aimed	if	the	competentices	of	key	stakeholders	(especially	managers	and	
trustees)	are	not	developed	as	well.	
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Sažetak
PREVENTIVNO RESTRUKTURIRANJE TRGOVAČKIH 
DRUŠTAVA U POTEŠKOĆAMA – ISTI KROJ ZA SVE ILI 
ODIJELO PO MJERI?
Republika	Hrvatska	 je	 trenutno	suočena	s	najvećim	restrukturiranjem	društva	
u	poteškoćama	uz	značajno	sudjelovanje	inozemnih	investitora.	Restrukturiranje	se	
provodi	prema	novom	Zakonu	o	postupku	izvanredne	uprave	u	trgovačkim	društvima	
od	sistemskog	značaja	za	Republiku	Hrvatsku.	Taj	zakon	je	usvojen	u	vrijeme	izbijanja	
krize	najvećeg	 trgovačkog	diva	 -	Agrokor	grupe.	Restrukturiranje	grupe	postalo	 je	
ubrzo	prvorazredno	političko	pitanje	koje	 je	plijenilo	pozornost	 javnosti.	Navedeni	
zakon	kritiziran	je	u	pravnoj	doktrini	i	u	javnosti	da	je	osmišljen	samo	radi	spašavanja	
jedne	 poslovne	 grupacije	 u	Hrvatskoj	 te	 i	 da	 nije	 u	 skladu	 s	 ustavnim	 načelima	 i	
postojećim	stečajnim	zakonodavstvom.	Njime	je	kreiran	model	izvanredne	uprave	kao	
posebnog	sudskog	postupka	u	kojem	glavnu	ulogu	igra	izvanredni	povjerenik,	a	koji	
je	namijenjen	 trgovačkim	društvima	od	sistemskog	značaja	za	Republiku	Hrvatsku	
koja	se	nalaze	u	stanju	insolventnosti	ili	predinsolventnosti.	Pošavši	od	toga	ovaj	rad	
namjerava	istražiti	širu	sliku	modela	restrukturiranja	usporedbom	tri	različita	pravna	
modela	restruktuiranja	društva	u	poteškoćama:	njemački	model	Shutzschirmverfahren,	
engleski	Schemes of Arrangment	i	talijanski	model	izvanredne	uprave.	U	radu	će	se	
istražiti	učinkovitost	svakog	od	pojedinih	modela	na	temelju	relevantnih	studija	koje	
upućuju	na	njhovu	uspješnost.	U	radu	se	daje	pregled	razvoja	hrvatskog	prava	kojim	
se	uređuje	tzv.	preventivno	restruktuiranje,	te	se	propituju	određena	pitanja	vezano	uz	
navedeni	zakonski	akt,	posebice	koncept	trgovačkog	društva	od	sistemskog	značaja.
Ključne riječi: restrukturiranje trgovačkih društava; društva u poteškoćama; 
izvanredna uprava; restrukturiranje povezanih društava; 
društva od sistemskog značaja.
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Zussamenfassung
VORBEUGENDE RESTRUKTURIERUNG VON 
UNTERNEHMEN IN SCHWIERIGKEITEN – EIN 
UNIVERSALANSATZ ODER MASSGESCHNEIDERTE 
LÖSUNGEN?
Die	Republik	Kroatien	wird	mit	der	größten	Restrukturierung	von	Unternehmen	
in	 Schwierigkeiten	 konfrontiert.	 Dabei	 werden	 im	 Wesentlichen	 internationale	
Investoren	 einbezogen.	Die	Restrukturierung	wird	 gemäß	 dem	kürzlich	 erlassenen	
Gesetz	 über	 das	 Verfahren	 der	 Sonderverwaltung	 von	 den	 für	 die	 Republik	
Kroatien	 systemrelevanten	 Unternehmen	 umgesetzt.	 Das	 Gesetz	 wurde	 nach	 dem	
Zusammenbruch	 des	 größten	 privaten	 Einzelhandelsunternehmens	 (der	 Agrokor	
Gruppe)	 erlassen.	 Die	 Restrukturierung	 der	 Gruppe	 wurde	 bald	 zu	 dem	 politisch	
heiklen	 Problem	 und	 zu	 einem	 aktuellen	 Thema	 öffentlicher	 Diskussionen.	 Das	
Gesetz	wurde	sowohl	von	den	Rechtswissenschaftlern	als	auch	von	der	Öffentlichkeit	
stark	 dafür	 kritisiert,	 dass	 es	 nur	 für	 eine	 Gruppe	 von	 Unternehmen	 entworfen	
wurde	und	dass	es	mit	den	verfassungsrechtlichen	Grundsätzen	und	den	geltenden	
Insolvenzgesetzen	 inkohärent	 ist.	 Das	 Gesetz	 ermöglichte	 die	 Sonderverwaltung	
als	ein	besonderes	Gerichtsverfahren,	 in	dem	der	Sonderverwalter	die	größte	Rolle	
spielt,	 und	 wurde	 den	 für	 die	 Republik	 Kroatien	 systemrelevanten	 Unternehmen	
gewidmet,	welche	in	Insolvenz	gegangen	sind	oder	später	in	Insolvenz	gehen	werden.	
Ausgehend	von	diesem	Hintergrund	ist	es	das	Ziel	dieses	Beitrags	ein	Gesamtbild	der	
Restrukturierung	zu	verschaffen,	indem	man	drei	unterschiedliche	Rechtsmodelle	der	
vorbeugenden	Restrukturierung	von	Unternehmen	in	Schwierigkeiten	vergleicht:	das	
deutsche	 Schutzschirmverfahren,	 das	 englische	Scheme-of-Arrangement	Verfahren,	
und	das	italienische	Verfahren	der	Sonderverwaltung.	Im	Beitrag	wird	versucht,	die	
Wirksamkeit	jedes	Modells	anhand	relevanter	Forschungen	über	ihre	Erfolgsquoten	
einzuschätzen.	Bezüglich	des	kroatischen	Gesetzes	wird	im	Beitrag	die	Entwicklung	
des	 Gesetzes	 über	 vorbeugende	 Restrukturierung	 dargestellt,	 wobei	 bestimmte	
Aspekte	des	Gesetzes,	insbesondere	der	Begriff	des	systemrelevanten	Unternehmens,	
hinterfragt	werden.	
Schlüsselwörter: Unternehmensrestrukturierung; Unternehmen in Schwieri-
gkeiten; Sonderverwaltung; Restrukturierung der Unterneh-
mensgruppe; systemrelevante Unternehmen.
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Riassunto
LA RISTRUTTURAZIONE PREVENTIVA DI SOCIETÀ IN 
CRISI – LA STESSA TAGLIA PER TUTTI O UN ABITO SU 
MISURA?
La	 Repubblica	 di	 Croazia	 in	 questo	 momento	 si	 trova	 dinanzi	 alla	 più	
grande	 ristrutturazione	 di	 società	 in	 crisi	 con	 una	 significativa	 partecipazione	 di	
investitori	 stranieri.	 La	 ristrutturazione	 viene	 condotta	 nel	 rispetto	 della	 nuova	
Legge	 sull’amministrazione	 straordinaria	 nelle	 società	 commerciali,	 che	 ha	 un	
valore	 sistemico	 per	 la	 Repubblica	 di	 Croazia.	 Tale	 legge	 è	 stata	 emanata	 nel	
momento	dell’esplosione	della	crisi	del	più	grande	colosso	commerciale	–	il	gruppo	
Agrokor.	La	 ristrutturazione	 del	 gruppo	 è	 presto	 diventata	 una	 questione	 di	 primo	
ordine	anche	sul	piano	politico,	che	ha	catturato	l’attenzione	dell’intera	collettività.	
La	 legge	menzionata	 è	 stata	 criticata	 nella	 dottrina	 giuridica	 e	 nella	 collettività	 in	
quanto	pensata	esclusivamente	per	 il	 salvataggio	di	un	gruppo	 in	Croazia	e	perché	
non	ritenuta	conforme	ai	principi	costituzionali	ed	all’esistente	legislazione	in	materia	
fallimentare.	Con	tale	legge	viene	creato	un	modello	di	amministrazione	straordinaria	
alla	 stregua	 di	 un	 procedimento	 giudiziale	 speciale	 nel	 quale	 il	 ruolo	 principale	
viene	 giocato	 dal	 commissario	 straordinario,	 rivolto	 alle	 società	 commerciali	 di	
valore	sistemico	per	la	Repubblica	di	Croazia,	che	si	 trovino	in	stato	di	 insolvenza	
oppure	di	pre-insolvenza.	Partendo	da	ciò	 il	presente	 lavoro	 intende	 indagare	circa	
il	più	ampio	quadro	del	modello	di	ristrutturazione	mediante	la	comparazione	di	tre	
differenti	modelli	giuridici	di	 ristrutturazione	di	società	 in	crisi:	 il	modello	 tedesco	
dello Shutzschirmverfahren,	l’inglese	Schemes of Arrangment ed il modello italiano 
di	amministrazione	straordinaria.	Nel	lavoro	verrà	analizzata	l’efficienza	di	ciascuno	
dei	modelli	in	base	a	studi	rilevanti	che	orientano	verso	la	loro	fattibilità.	Nel	lavoro	
si	passa	in	rassegna	lo	sviluppo	del	diritto	croato	mediante	il	quale	si	disciplina	la	c.d.	
ristrutturazione	preventiva	e	ci	si	interroga	circa	determinate	questioni	relative	all’atto	
legislativo,	in	particolare	al	concetto	di	società	commerciale	di	valore	sistemico.
Parole chiave: ristrutturazione di società; società in crisi; amministrazione 
straordinaria; gruppo di società in ristrutturazione; società di 
valore sistemico.
